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Reinhold Nlehuhr is one of America's leading contemporary social, reli¬
gious and political thinkers* He is a prominent Protestant theologian and
has written widely on social ethics and political affairs. His reputation
as a political philosopher continues to grow. "Niehuhr's eminence as a
prophet and theologian is now being matched by his rapidly growing reputa¬
tion as a political theorist. Increasingly, he is cited, reprinted and
critically analyzed by students of international relations and political
1 -
philosophy,”
Niebuhr is a prolific writer. His literary output includes sixteen
volumes and several hundreds of essays and articles published during the
past four decades in the leading Journals. His influence on the contempo¬
rary scene is immense and his critics and admirers are numerous.
Reinhold Niebuhr was born in I892 in Wright City, Missouri, After pre¬
paring for the ministry at Eden Theological Seminary in St, Louis, he en¬
tered Yaile University, taking his B.D, degree in I91U and his M.A. degree in
1915. From 1928 until his recent retirement, he was Professor of Christian
Ethics and Philosophy of Religion at Union Theological Soninary in New York
City.
Before embarking on a study of Niebxihr's theory of international rela¬
tions, it will be necessary to study his conception of human nature which
stems from Biblical presuppositions. It is Niebuhr's thesis that much of
our failure in dealing with political problems is attributable to a view of




human nature which is inconsistent with Christian presuppositions. Poli**
tics, in Niebuhr, is intimately related to his theology. A grave injus¬
tice to his thoughts results when his political writings are studied with¬
out a parallel study of his theology.
Niebuhr is a difficult writer. His dialectical style, with its Jux¬
taposition of opposites, is most demanding. Furthermore, concerning poli¬
tics, Niebuhr has not been a systematic writer. Therefore, our task of pre¬
senting a theory of international relations which is at once coherent, ade¬
quate and does Justice to Niebuhri is. an imposing one.
Methodology, as used herein, refers to the problems and procedures in-
volved in collecting, organizing and presenting the data. The methodologi¬
cal approaches used in this study are descriptive, comparative, and analyt¬
ic.
CHAPTER II
THE DOCTRINE OF HUMAN NATURE
The doctrine of human nature is the basis for the political and social
thoTight of Reinhold Niebuhr. He seeks an interpretation vhich will at once
explain ”the dignity of man and his misery,” his greatness and his small¬
ness, Once formulated, Niebuhr’s doctrine of man serves not only as the
banis for the delineation of hiunan nature, but as an interpretive doctrine
of the historical process, seeking to make history meaningful in the light
of man's unique freedom which allows him to transcend the determinateness
of nature, thereby becoming creator of, as well as creature in, the histor¬
ical drama, Niebuhr's doctrine of history will be presented in another
chapter. It is o\ir puarpose here to present his doctrine of human nature, for
it is clear to Niebuhr that false presuppositions concerning man's true na¬
ture must lead to misinterpretations of his social actions. The problem of
Interpreting man's nat\ire is stated thusly by Niebuhr:
Man has always been his own most vexing problem. How shall he
think of himself? Every affirmation which he may make about
his stature, virtue, or place in the cosmos becomes Involved
in contradictions when fully analyzed. The analysis reveals
some presuppositions or implications which seem to deny what
the proposition Intended to affirm.^
Despite the contradictions which any interpretation is likely to yield,
there are two facts about man, Niebuhr says, to which the paradoxes point-
one fact is obvious; but the second is not.
The obvious fact is that man is a child of nature, subject to
its vicissitudes, compelled by its necessities, driven by its
impulses, and confined within the brevity of the years which
nature permits its varied organic form, allowing them some.




but not too much latitude. The other less obvious fact Is that
man Is a spirit who stands outside of nature« life, himself, and
his reason and the v6rld.2
Ultimately, any delineation of man's nature must encompass the determi¬
nate and the transcendent aspects of his character If It Is to do Justice to
his true natxire. Niebuhr analyzes man from three viewpoints: (1) The clas¬
sical view, (2) the modem view, and (3) the Biblical view,
A. The Classical View of Man
The classical view, composed of elements from Platonic, Aristotelian,
and Stoic conceptions of human nature. Interprets man primarily, according
to Niebuhr, In terms of his rational faculties. This Interpretation ex¬
presses Itself In the Greek word, nous, which In both Plato and Aristotle
emphasizes man's Intellectual capacity. Mind, therefore. Is sharply dis¬
tinguished from body.
Plato and Aristotle thus share a comron rationalism; and also a
common dualism which Is explicit In the case of Plato and Implic¬
it and covert In the case of Aristotle. The effect of this ra¬
tionalism and dualism has been determinative for the classical
doctrine of man and for all modem doctrines borrowed from It.3
The consequences of this dualism have been the Identification of mind
with the divine and goodness, cmd of the body with evil. Niebuhr thinks
that this Is In contradiction to the Biblical view. "The Bible" he avers,
4
"knows nothing of a good man and an evil body,"
The classical view of man Is essentially optimistic. It Is In the





portrayal falls shorty for it fails to present adequate answers for the
problems posed. Niebtihr believes that when modem man revived classical
thou^t, he failed to Incorporate the tragic dimensions of h\2man existence
as expounded by the tragedians in the revival. He writes that " the mes¬
sage of Aeschylus and Sophocles was neither understood nor misunderstood.
5
It was sinply neglected,...." This neglect of the pessimistic elements
in Greek thou^t led to the false hope that human virtue and Intelligence
would insure progress. The ultimate perfectibility of man was made a dis¬
tinct possibility.
B. The Modem View of Man
Modem man's conception of human nature is a curious compound of the
classical. Biblical, and instinctively modem motifs, which,Nlebuhr as-
6
serts, contains three perplexing problems. The first problem Involves
the inner contradictions between the rationalists themselves (idealistic
and naturalistic) and between the rationalists \mited against the romanti¬
cists. The crux of the conflict between the rationalists and the romanti¬
cists lies in which interpretation of man shall prevail. "Modern man, in
short, cannot determine whether he shall understand himself primarily from
the standpoint of the uniqueness of his reason or from the standpoint of
7
his affinity with nature."
The second problem Involves Individuality. Hiebuhr sees the individ¬





and buttressed by neo-Platonic conceptions, as being dissipated culturally,
by idealism and naturalism. The idealists lose individuality in the abso¬
lute mind, and the natiiralists lose it in "streams of consciousness" and in
"laws of motions" when dealing with it from the disciplines of psychology
and sociology, respectively. For Niebuhr, it is quite obvious that
A genuine individuality can be maintained only in terms of re¬
ligious presuppositions which can do Justice to the immediate in¬
volvement of human individuality in all the organic forms and so¬
cial tensions of history, while yet appreciating its ultimate
transcendence over every social and historlal situation in the
highest reaches of its self-transcendence. The paradox of man
as creature and man as child of' God is a necessary presupposi¬
tion of a concept of Individuality, strong enotigh to maintain it¬
self against.the pressures of history, and reedistic enough to do
Justice to the orgemic cohesloiu of soclcd llfe.^
The third problem can be formxilated as modern man's certainties about
htuuan nature, particularly concerning his Innate goodness. The Christian
conception of sin is rejected; instead, "...it finds the root of his evil
in his involvement in natural Impulses and nat\xral necessities from which
9
it hopes to free him by the increase of his rational faculties." Modern
man believes he can eliminate the source of historical evil; the doctrine of
progress is the expression of that optimism. To Niebuhr, the idea of pro¬
gress is possible only in a Christian inlture. "It's a secularized version
of Biblical apocalypse and of the Hebraic sense of a meemlngful hlstozy, in
10
contrast to the meaningless history of the Greeks." The idea of progress,
stripped of the Christiem doctrine of sinful man, paves the way for simple





freedom of man or to the daemonic misuse vhich he may make of that free-
11
dom."
The three difficulties or problems involved in the interpretations of
human nature by modern man point to the same source of error,
Man is not meastired in a dimension sufficiently high or deep to
do full Justice to either his statxtre or his capacity for both
good and evil or to understand the total environment in vhich
such a structure can understand, express and find itself.
C. 212. Biblical View of Mm
The Christian delineation of man, in the eyes of Niebuhr, is deter»
13
mined by the presuppositions of the Christian faith. He asserts that
there are tvo Important characteristics of the Christian view of man. First,
"God is both vitality and form emd the source of all existence. He creates
the vorld. The world is not God; but it is not evil because it is not God.
l4
Being God's creation, it is good." This view differs substantially from
that held by the Greeks in which the divine as Mind gives form to formless
matter; also, it allows an appreciation of the unity of body and soul in the
human personality, which, Niebuhr says, eludes the idealists and the natu¬
ralists.
Secondly, in the Christian view, man is interpreted not from the vantage






creator. Man, therefore, Is made in the "image of God," and this is the
tnie basis for his individuality.
God as will and personality, in concepts of Christian faith, is
thus the only possible ground of real individuality, though not
the only possible presupposition of self-consciousness. But
faith in God as vlll and personality depends upon faith in His
power to reveal Himself. The Christian faith in God's self-
disclosure, culminating in the revelation of Christ, is thus the
basis of the Christian concept of personality and individuality.
In terms of this faith man can \uiderstand himself as a unity of
will which finds its end in the will of God.l^
We shall explore Niebuhr's concept of sin in detail below, but at this
point let us say that the presuppositions of the Christian faith enable man
to find that sin emanates from within himself* "Only in a religion of rev¬
elation," Niebuhr asserts, "whose God reveals Himself to man from beyond
himself and from beyond the contrast of vitality and form, can man discover
16
the root of sin to be within himself."
This brief adumbration of Nieb\ihr's analysis of the classical, modern,
and Biblical views of man demonstrates his belief that only the Biblical in¬
terpretation of man is capable of explaining man's unique characteristics.
The Christian view of man becomes the basis for Niebuhr's "realistic" ap¬
proach to human behavior.
D. Man As Sinner
The doctrine of sin is one of the most widely discussed facets of Nie¬





"Sin is Niebuhr’s central concern." Professor Harland is of the opinion
that Niebuhr's analysis of sin is one of his profound contributions to con-
18
temporary theology. It is well beyond the scope of this study and the
con^etence of the writer to present a detailed analysis of Niebuhr's doc¬
trine of sin. Yet it will be necessary to outline it because it consti¬
tutes an integral part of his doctrine of human nature. In fact, the con¬
ception of man as sinner is a vital concept in the whole realistic theolog-
19
ical movement of which Niebuhr is a prominent member.
1, The Origin and Nattire of Sin
In the Christian conception of human nature, according,to Niebuhr, man
is unequivocally a sinner. Man's position in the universe is highly ambig¬
uous, for at once he is finite and free. This ambiguity is the occasion,
yet not the cause of man's sin, for "there is no absolute necessity that man
should be betrayed into sin by the ambiguity of his position, as standing in
20
and yet above nature." Because man is finite and free, limited and limit¬
less, he is anxious. "Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of the paradox
of freedom and finiteness in which man is Involved. Anxiety is the internal
21
precondition of sin."
^"^Hans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York, 1956),
p. 2U7.
^®Gordon Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York, i960),
p. 76.
19Mary F, Thelen, Man As Sinner in Contemporary American Realistic The¬
ology (New York, 19^6), p, 1.
^%iebuhr, op, cit., I, 178.
^^Ibid.. p. 182.
10
Yet for Nletuhr, anxiety does not constitute sin. "Anxiety is the
psychological condition vhlch precedes sin. It is so near, so fearfully
22
near to sin, and yet it is not the explanation for sin." Anxiety is not
sin for two reasons. First, there is the possibility which faith holds
for man. "The ideal possibility" Niebuhr says, "is that faith in the ul¬
timate security of God's love would overcome all immediate Insecurities of
23
nature and history." Second, the creative aspect of man has its source
in anxiety. In other words, anxiety is not only the precondition of sin
but also of creativity.
It is the condition of the sailor, climbing the mast (to use a
simile), with the abyss of the waves beneath him and the 'crow's
nest' above him. He is anxious about both the end toward which
he strives and the abyss of nothingness into which he may fall.2^
Anxiety, therefore, cannot itself constitute sin because it produces
positive as well as evil functions.
2. The Doctrine of Original Sin
25
"The Bible defines sin in both religious and moral terms," Niebuhr
avers. Man's rebellion against God constitutes the religious dimension,
and his injustices toward his fellow-men constitute the social and moral di¬
mension. The concept of sin in these terms is readily understood and in¬
volves no difficulties. However, when we examine Niebuhr's analysis of orig¬






perceived by Niebuhr to be inevitable because it flows from man's freedom;
yet it is not necessary.
Here is the absurdity in a nutshell. Original sin, which is by
definition an inherited corruption, or at least an inevitable
one, is nevertheless not to be regeirded as belonging to his es>
sential nat\u:e and therefore is not outside the realm of his
responsibility. Sin is natural for man in the sense that it is
vmlversal but not in the sense that it is necessary.26
Sin, then, is not a necessity of man's nature, nor is it to be regard¬
ed as a pure caprice of his will. ”It proceeds rather from a defect of the
27
will...." On this point. Professor Thelen writes;
Of his own free will, without its being a necessary outcome of
his nature, he sins in every act. Instead of accepting his
weakness and ignorance and trusting in God to provide him a se¬
cure place in the universe of mesuiing, he seeks ^o make himself
Invulnerable and pretends that his truth is the final truth and
the center of all meaning. This Fall is said by Niebuhr to be
'inevitable' on the ground that it infects every act, although
there are no premises from which it may be shown to be logical¬
ly necessary, and thou^ it is committed in man's freedom.
Original sin is then postulated as a defect of the will, or 'bi¬
as' in the will, which characterizes the will before any act and
whose experience is inferred from the universality of sin. Orig¬
inal sin is to be distinguished from actual sin in that it is
not an act at all but the presupposition of every act.28
Original sin, for Niebuhr, cannot be attributed to a definite locus in
time. The "Fall" is regarded as a myth and cannot lltereJ.ly be interpreted
as the sovirce of evil, nor can original sin be traced to an inherited cor¬
ruption in man. "The myth of the Fall," he argues, "is made into an account
29
of the origin of evil, when it is really a description of its nature."
26ibid.. p. 2U2.
^'^Ibid.
^®Thelen, op. cit.. p. 95*
86
^^Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York, 1956), p
12
He analyzes the problem further by stating: ”To believe that there is a
devil is to believe that there is a principle or force of evil antecedent
30
to any evil human action," And concerning original sin, he says: "Orig¬
inal sin is not an inherited corruption but the inevitable fact of human
existence, the inevitability of which is given by the nature of man’s
spirituality. It is true in every moment of existence, but it has no his-
31
tory,"
Ultimately, Niebvihr'a doctrine of sin is somewhat shrouded in mystery,
for as Professor Thelen points out, "any analysis of sin always shows sin
32
to be among the factors from which it arises," Niebuhr himself concisely
summarizes the insvirmountable difficulty by saying:
Perhaps the best description or definition of this mystery is the
statement that sin posits itself, that there is no situation in
which it is possible to say that sin is either an inevitable con¬
sequence of the situation nor yet that it is an act of sheer and
perverse individual defiance of God,33
E, The Sin of Pride
In Niebuhr's thought there are three aspects of sin which correspond
to the transgression of the virtues of harmony with God: (l) Pride, (2) In-
3k
Justice, and (3) sensuality. The latter two are derivatives of the first.
Injustices result when man makes his security the end of his action and his
30Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, I, l80,
3lNiebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p, 86,
32Thelen, op, cit,, p, 95,
33Niebuhr, The Nat\ire and Destiny of Man. I, l8l.
3^?helen, op, cit,. p. 98.
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point of vlev the ultimate truth by asserting his life at the expense of
others. Sensuality is the result of man regarding an in^ulse within him as
35
constituting his end.
For our purposes, it seems sufficient only to examine pride as a mani¬
festation of sin. There are, says Nieh^lhr, three types of pride which in
actuality are never distinct. They are: (l) pride of power, (2) pride of
knowledge, suid (3) spiritual and moral pride.
1. The Pride of Power
The pride of power as analyzed by Niebuhr assumes two forms. First,
there is pride of power in which the ego feels secure and self-sufficient.
The ego falls to recognize its dependency on other forms of life. This form
of power is present in an inchoate form in all hviman life but particularly
in those in which great social power is invested. Second, there is the form
in which the ego feels Insecure and grasps for more power to bolster its in¬
security. ”In the one case the ego seems unconscious of the finite and de¬
terminate character of its existence. In the other case the lust for power
36
is pron?>ted by a darkly conscious realization of its insecurity.”
2. Intellectual Pride
”A11 human knowledge,” writes Niebuhr, ”is tainted with an Ideological
37
taint.” Man pretends to possess \iltlmate knowledge, when in fact he pos¬
sesses finite knowledge. This form of power is a sublimated form of the
35Thelen, Ibid.
3%iebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. I, 180.
37ibid.. p. 194
Ik
pride of power and is analogous to it. On the one hand, intellectual pride
is derived from ignorance of the finiteness of the human mind, and on the
other hand from an attempt to ohscxire the known conditioned character of
human knowledge. The temptations of human freedom and insecurity are in¬
volved in every manifestation of intellectual pride, Niebuhr asserts. If
man did not possess freedom, and if he were not able to transcend situa¬
tions in which he is involved, he would not be ten^ted to claim for his fi¬
nite perspective, absolute validity. And if he were simply a child of na-*
ture, totally dependent thereupon, he.would not therefore be tempted to
38
confuse his truth with the truth.
3. Moral and Spiritual Pride
Finite man pretends that his conditioned virtue is the final righteous¬
ness and that his relative moral standeurds are absolute. It is this preten¬
sion on the part of finite man that occasions moral pride. Believing its
standards to be good, the self Judges others in the light of its own stand¬
ards; when they fail to measure to the self's standards, they are judged to
be evil. "This is the secret," Niebuhr believes, "of the relationship be-
39
tween cruelty and self-righteousness."
"The sin of moral pride, when it has conceived, brings forth spiritual
pride. The ultimate sin is the religious sin of making the self-deification
Uo
implied in moral pride explicit." This phenomenon arises whenever divine
sanctions are claimed by the self for its relative standards and conditioned




good. Spiritual pride is manifested by dominant classes which claim reli¬
gious sanctions for their position, in religions that claim to possess fi¬
nal truths, and even in secular pronouncements which make unconditioned
claims as to their finality. To all who would lay claim to their good as
constituting the highest possible good, Hiebuhr solemnly warns that ”,,,Grod
will discover man’s highest not only to be short of the highest but in-
Ul
volved in the dishonesty of claiming that it is the highest,”
F, Evaluation
Althou^ Niebuhr has written extensively on politics, he has not writ¬
ten a systematic treatise on the subject. This is not true concerning hu¬
man nature, for in The Nat\ire and Destiny of Man, he makes explicit his the¬
ory of human nature. Elements of Niebuhr's political realism appeared in
his writings long before the publication of his treatise on human nature;
therefore, it is difficult to say whether his political realism stons from
his conception of human nature or whether his conception of human nature was
moulded to fit the general framework of his political realism. The question
may only be of academic interest, for the important point is that he does de¬
lineate in broad outlines a realistic theory of human nature.
Our evaluation of Niebuhr’s doctrine of man will proceed along two gen¬
eral lines. First we shall analyze his method of arriving at what he con¬
siders to be the truth; second, we shall investigate his assertions that the
Christian view of man embodies the final truth about the human condition.
As we have seen, Niebuhr’s doctrine of man is predicated on Christian
presuppositions. He believes that the deeper truths concerning man, history,
^^Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. I, 203,
16
society, reality and God must te stated In terms which he sometimes de¬
scribes as paradoxical and sometimes as dialectical so that full Justice
can he given to their contradictory aspects. For example, man Is not sim¬
ply a creature Immersed In the finite state of existence, hut also a ’’spir¬
it who stands outside of nature, life, himself, his reason and the world.”
How, then, we may legitimately ask. Is It possible for man to transcend
reason and yet to comprehend his transcendence through the very process of
reasoning which has been transcended? According to one of Niebuhr's crlt-
42
Ics, "to transcend reason Is to transcend comprehension.”
However, Niebuhr Insists that the complex facts of existence must be
expressed In paradoxical or dialectical terms even at the expense of defy¬
ing canons of logic.
There Is a dimension of human existence which makes all purely
ratlonedistlc interpretations, not to speak of purely natural¬
istic ones. Inadequate. That is the dimension of the eternal
In the human spirit, which reveals itself In the capacity of
the self to transcend not only the processes of nature but the
operations of Its own reason, and to stemd, as it were, above
the structures and coherences of the world.^3
Niebuhr's method of approaching the truth causes great difficulties to
those who are habituated to the dlsjunective proposition, ”either-or,"
rather than to the dialectical, ”both-and.” This is readily perceived when
Vlastos argues that within the total structure of Niebuhr's thought, man's
nature is
defined, described and analyzed In terms of what he is not and
can never be. Man is what he cannot be—free, self-determlnlng,
^^Gregory Vlastos, "Sin and Anxiety In Niebuhr's Religion,” The Chrls-
tlaq^Century. LVIII (October 1, 1941), 1202.
**3]jiebuhr, "Intellectual Biography,” Relnhold Niebuhr; Hla Religious.
Social, and Political Thought, eds. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall
(New Yori, 1961), p. 17.
17
self-transcendent* Man must do what he actually cannot do—love
his neighbor not only himself» but so much more than himself
that regard for his neighbor completely'eliminate* regard for him¬
self. These are staggering paradoxes...
Staggering paradoxes, yes, but Niebuhr is not alone in using paradox
to describe the complex facts of existence. Scientists and mathematicians,
when confronted with seeming insoluble problems in the field of naturall
science and mathematics, make somewhat similar statements. Admittedly, the
two realms are not the same, (the inanimate world of science and the world
of man), yet the following parallels between the thoughts of Niebuhr and of
some ttoinent scientists and mathematicians are useful analogies.
Einstein, says it is impossible for man to take ultimate measure¬
ments of speed because he himself is in motion; Niebuhr says it
is impossible for man to make ultimate judgments in history' be¬
cause man himself is moving within time and history;
Heisenberg says an object is changed by the process of being
viewed; Niebuhr says that the acting self is changed by the
process of being viewed by/the self-transcendent self;
Bohr denies either-or in regard to light; Niebuhr denies either-
or in regard to religion*
Qodell shows, that man’s reason operates within a sphere which
logic cannot make wholly/ logical; Niebuhr points to the limits
of logic in the sphere of the self and its existential encoun^
ters.^5
Niebuhr’s claim that the Christian faith contains the final truth about
man; history, love (agape) and Christ presents more of a dilemma than his
method of arriving at the truth. The assertions to finality are bewildering
inassuch as he himself has written that
However we twist or turn, whatever instruments or pretensions we
use, it is not possible to establish the claim that we have the
M^Vlastos, loc* cit*. p. 1202.
^5jtine Bingham, Courage to Changet An Introduction to the Life and
Thought of Reiiihold Niebuhr (New Yprk, 19^1), p. 263*
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truth. The truth remains subject to the paradox of grace. We
may hare it; and yet ve do not have it. And we will have it the
more purely in fact if we know that we have it only in principle.
Our toleration of truths opposed to those which we confess is an
expression of the spirit of forgiveness in the realm of culture.
Like all forgiveness, it is possible only if we axe not too sure
of our own virtue.^®
Yet to Niebuhr, Christianity is ”the final truth about life and his-
tory...the final key to this historical interpretation.”
We are told that ”moral pride is the pretension of finite man that his
highly conditioned virtue is the final righteousness and that his very rel-
U8
ative moral standards are absolute.” But does not Niebtihr commit moral
pride when he unequivocally states that the final norm for man is the heed¬
less love (aga^e) morality of the Cross? For, ”if no truth is final, then
it is not final either that the relation between time and eternity is dia-
k9
lectical or that agape defines the rule of our free responsibilities.”
If, as Niebuhr insists, all knowledge is corrupted through self-inter¬
est and finite perspective, then Iti is quite clear that his Judgments con¬
cerning man are open to the same charges he has leveled against others.
"Any principle which explains the corruption of all knowledge explains the
50
corruptions of no knowledge, for it has already corrupted itself.” There¬
fore, Niebvihr's claims that the Christian view of man represents final
knowledge is untenable. He fails to transcend the ambiguities and the limi-
^^Niebuhr, The Nature etnd Destiny of Man. II, 2^3.
**TiMd.. p. 211.
*^®Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. I, 199*




tatlons of finite man vhich his analyses of others reveal.
In this study, hovever, ve are mainly concerned with whether or not
Niebuhr's doctrine of man provides a frame of reference in vhich man's po¬
litical behavior C6m be realistically interpreted. Many political philos¬
ophers, seeking an understanding of political phenomena, either ground
their political theory in political institutions and processes, or as Nie¬
buhr, attempt to probe the depths of the human spirit. "Niebuhr founds his
theory of world politics on a general conception of human nature. His the-
51
ory is essentially architectonic,”
Ve shall have more to say in the following chapters about Niebuhr's
political realism. At this point ve find it necessary to state that al-
thou^ from a logical point of view ve cannot support his claims that the
Christian conception of man embodies final knowledge (for reasons outlined
above), ve do believe that his view of man provides a sound base upon vhich
to elaborate a realistic approach to the study of politics. In point of
fact, "Niebuhr has been the father of the realist approach to international
52
politics in this country...."
^^Kenneth W. Thompson, "Beyond National Interest; A Critical Review of
Reinhold Niebiihr's Theory of International Politics," The Review of Politics,




The collective behavior of man deserves special consideration and is of
particular importance to our study of Nieb\]hr'8 theory of international re¬
lations. In his first book. Does Civilization Need Religion?. Hiebuhr con¬
tends that "All human groups tend to be more predatory than the individu8J.s
1
which con5)ose them," In his second work. Leaves From the Notebook of a
Tamed Cynic, the same idea is expressed, but from a person&d point of view,
when he states that "Men are clearly not lovely in the mass. One can main-
tain confidence in them only by viewing them at close range-." Again: "I
save myself from cynicism by knowing individuals, and knowing them intimate¬
ly. If I viewed humanity only from some distant and hi^ perspective I
could not save myself from mlsanthrophy. I think the reason is simply that
people are not decent in their larger relationship as in their more intimate
3
contacts." These were the germinal ideas for the thesis which was greatly
elaborated and analyzed by Niebuhr in ttoral Man and Immoral Society, pub¬
lished in 1932. The thesis continues to occupy a prominent place in Niebuhr's
social thou^t, for in the preface to the I960 edition of that work, (Moral
Man and Immoral Society), he writes; "I still believe that the central thesis
of the book is important and I am still committed to it. The central thesis
was, and is, that of the Liberal movement, both religious and secular, which
seemed to be unconscious of the basic difference between the morality of in-
%iebuhr. Does Civilization Need Religion? (New York, 1928), p, 129




dlvlduals and the morality of collectiyes, whether races, classes or na-
k
tions,"
A. Moral Man and Immoral Society
The individual, Niebuhr believes, is not without certain considerations
for his fellow-man. Interests other than his own are often considered when
he is confronted with problems of conduct, and at times he actually places
the Interests of others above his own Interests. Through his rational facul¬
ty, he is endowed with a sense of Justice which enables him to view social
situations fairly objectively. "But all these achievements are more diffl-
5
cult, if not impossible for hximan societies and groups."
The individuals who compose the group are more likely to condone group
Immorality than individual Immorality and he attributes this phenomenon to
the following factors:
The inferiority of the morality of groups to that of indlvldxials
is due in part to the difficulty of establishing a rational so¬
cial force which is powerful enough to cope with the natural im¬
pulses by which society achieves its cohesion} but in part it is
merely the revelation of a collective egoism, compounded of the
egoistic impulses of Individuals, which achieve a more vivid ex¬
pression a more cumulative effect when they are united in a com¬
mon impulse than when they express themselves separately and dis¬
creetly.^
The collective behavior of man is related to that of individual man
living in a state of nature before being civilized; "...human groups, clas¬
ses, nations and races are selfish whatever may be the moral idealism of
individuals within the group; ...this selfishness has something of the or-




der of nature in it, predatory man expressing himself in his collective ca¬
pacity long after he has been tamed in his individual capacity*...*^
There are resources within the CJhristian religion which could eliminate
the predatoriness and selfishness of groups, but Niebuhr thinks that it is
impossible for groups to sacrifice themselves.
The Christian religion has an ideal of self-sacrifice which demands
that all men shall sacrifice themselves for others obviating the
necessity of conflict....No nation, race or class sacrifices it¬
self. Human groups make a virtue of the assertion! of self-interest
and will probably do so until the end of history^ The best that
can be expected of human, groups is a wise rather than stupid self-
interest.®
Most important for our study/is the realistic approach to politico that
such a view of the collective behavior of man presupposes. For if, as Nie¬
buhr contends, groups are more predatory euid selfish than individuals, it is
apparent that in.order to align the interests of the groups to those of soci¬
ety as a whole, coercive measures are necessary. He writest
Society will probably never be sufficiently-intelligent to bring
all power under its control. The stupidity of the average man
will permit the oligarch, whether economic or political, to hide
his real purposes from the scrutiny of his fellows.... Since it
is impossible to count on enough moral good will among those who
possess irresponsible power to sacrifice it for the good of the
whole, it must be destroyed by coercive methoda....9
The dilemma created ly the distinction between individual and collec¬
tive morality is acknowledged by Niebxihr when ho writes of the difficulty in:
trying to maintain faith in man while at the same time using coercive power
to dislodge group: interests. high morality demands trust in human nature
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Moralists and Politics," The Christian Century.
July 6, 1952, p. 857.
^Ibid.. p. 858.
%iebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society,, p. 21.
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and a realistic political strategy presupposes a measure of cjmlcism. To
maintcdn confidence in hiuuan nature and yet deal realistically with huiaan
evil is a task which requires a rather Imposslhle combination of realism
10
and idealism."
B, The Immorality of Rations
"The egoism of collective groups culminates in, and is personified by,
11
the national state. The selfishness of nations is proverbial." Further¬
more, "...the nation is most seriously tempted to unethical conduct because
it is not a voluntary association, its group is conveniently isolated from
others and loyalty to ii is at least qualified by other conflicting loyal-
12
ties." Also,
...The state gives the collective impulses of the nation such in¬
struments of power and presents the imagination of the individu¬
als with such obvious symbols of its discreet collective identi¬
ty that the national state is most able to make absolute claims
for itself, to enforce these claims by power and to give them
plausibility and credibility by the majesty and panoply of its
apparatus.^3
Further compounding the problem of the unethical behavior of nations
is the attitude of individuals within the nation, who transfer their own
unrealized ambitions, lust for power, and egoism to the omnipotent state.
Chi this point Niebuhr says:
The fmstratlons of the average man who can never realize the pow¬
er and glory which his imagination sets as the ideal, makes him
lONiebuhr, "Moralists and Politics," p. 859*
^Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 8U.
^Niebuhr, Does Civilization Heed Religion?, p. 132.
ISNiebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. I, 209.
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the more vllllng tool and victim of the imperial ambitions of his
group. His frustrated individual ambitions gain a measure of sat-
isfaction in the power and aggrandizement of his nation.
Nations as veil as Individuals are immersed in sin, and the sin of na¬
tions is also rebellion against God. "Nation after nation rise up to rebel
against God. Every nation tends, in human histozy to make itself more Im-
15
portant than it is, and so it is destroyed." Pride is the manifestation
of the sin of nations; "...it consists in the tendency to make uncondl-
16
tioned claims for their conditioned values."
While asserting that all nations are tainted with the sin of pride,
Niebuhr contends "that there are certain 'Christian* nations who cure recep¬
tive to prophetic words of Judgment that have been spoken against the na-
17
tion;" and "that it is Just as Important to recognize differences in the
degree of pride and self-will expressed by men and nations as it is to know
18
that all men and nations are sinful in the sight of God." To Niebvdir,
God is the rock agcdnst which all nations and empires rise and are de-
19
stroyed, yet he believes that there are redemptive and creative possibili-
20
ties in life for those who recognize and accept Judgment.
^^Niebxjhr, Moral, Man and Immoral Society, p. l8.
^^Hiebuhr, "The Role of Prophetic Religion in the World Crisis," Men of
Tomorrow, ed. Thomas H. Johnson (New York, 1956), p. 115.
l^Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. I, 219.
ITibid.
J-Qlbid.




Niebuhr's juxtaposition of the terms moral man and immoral society is
unfortxinate since it implies that society which is composed of individual*;
is immoral, whereas, individuals are moral. He is, however, aware of this
implication. *1 do not regard the individual as moral and society as im-
21
moral though I chose that title for my book for pedagogical purposes.*
Elaborating further on the point, he writesi
Society, in ny opinion merely cumulates the egoism of individu¬
als and transmutes their individual altruism into collective
egoism so that the egoism of the group has a double force. For
this reason no group acts from lurely/unselfish or even mutual
intent and politics is bound to be a contest of power.^
As was pointed out previously, we must regard Niebuhr's thesis as im¬
portant because it lays the foundation for dealing realistically with the
power of groups by the use. eouxrtervaillng power, without making power
Itself a norm, for according to him, "Justice without love is merely the
25
balance of power." Society is a "vast realm of pushing and pulling of
24
claims and counter claims, or groups in: conflict with groups.* These
groups, he believes, cannot transcend their own interests, and in the pur¬
suit: of their particular interests;they/will not contribute to the welfare
of society’ as a vdiole. This, Professor Meyer seys, is the basic structure
of his political realism: social morality is a morality of group Interest;
^^Qeorge A. Coe and Reihhold Niebuhr, "Two Cosoaunications, Coe vs.
Niebuhr," The Christian Century^ March 15» 1955» P» 5^2.
^Ibid.
^^Niebuhr, "Moralists and Politics,* p. 858.
24
Niebuhr, "The Role of Prophetic Religion in the World Crisis,*'p. II9.
26
the first consideration for strategy Is a calculation of power; and the
25
heart of strategy is to oppose power vith power.
Niebuhr seeks to make Justice the appropriate, goal of political life.
He thinks that disinterested love (agape), which embodies the highest ethi¬
cal conduct, is incapable of being realized, and remains as an ideal and as
a source of norms.
The problem of politics and economics is the problem of Justice.
The question of politics is how to coerce the anarchy of con¬
flicting human interests into some kind of order... All these
possibilities represent something less than the ideal of love.
Yet the lav of love is Involved in all approximations of Justice,
not only as a source of the norms of Justice, but as an \iltlmate
perspective by which their limitations are discovered.26
In Niebuhr's analysis love becomes an "Is^ossible possibility" which
serves as an ideal but which remains incapable of realization by collec¬
tives. The question eorises: Of what worth is such an ideal? Niebxihr's an¬
swer is; "It does work as an ideal which constantly reminds us of the alloy
of egoism in every mutual relation and saves us from the hypocrisy of believ¬
ing that we are \mselfish when we affirm the interest of another in order
27
that he may affirm our own Interest."
Niebuhr's recognition of the power struggle involved in the relation¬
ship between groups is of Immense value in the realistic approach to poli¬
tics. Few astute observers of the political scene would voice opposition
to him on this particular point. However, we discern three notable weak¬
nesses in Niebuhr's theory of collective egoism which we must dwell upon.
25Donald B. Meyer, The Protestant Search for Political Realism. 1919-
19^1 (Los Angeles, I960), p. 229.
2%iebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 128.
2Tcoe and Niebithr. op. cit.. p. 35**.
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First, Niebuhr inadequately distinguishes between interest groups which are
organized primarily for the advancement of their particular interests and
socie^. or other groups which do not attempt to influence the political pro»
cess. In his analysis, all groups have inordinate motives and therefore are
Immoral regardless of the purpose for which they were organized. Further¬
more, Niebuhr gives insufficient attention to the vital roles played by
groups in a pluralistic society in which the powers of various groups are
checked by the countervailing power of other groups. According to Professor
Ramsey
Niebuhr switches too easily from the delineation and castigation
of the motives of men and nations to the data supplied by their
external conduct and (with little or no warrant frm our reli¬
gious ethics) finds in the latter evidence of the nature of the
former,28
Second, Nieb\ihr treats collectives as though they are possessed of mind,
body and heart and always act with a concerted will. The following passage
is Indicative of this treatment.
Only a forgiving love, grounded in repentance, is adequate to heal
the animosities between nations. But that degree of love is an
impossibility for nations. It is a very rare achievement among in¬
dividuals; and the mind and heart of collective man is notoriously
less imaginative than that of the individual.29
There is no mind and heart of collective man, but only as pointed out
by Professor Ramsey, "individuad men and women engaged in collective action
by means of a gradation of leaders who also are individuals with a mixture
30
of motives in what they do in public and in private life."
^®Paul Ramsey, "Love and Law," Reinhold Niebuhr; His Religious. Social.
and Political Thought, eds, Kegley and Bretall, p. 111.
29Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. II8,
^^Ramsey, loc, cit., p.lll.
28
Third, although Hiehuhr makes a distinction between individual and
groiq) morality, he seeks to subject both to the ultimate norm of disinter¬
ested love (agape)» This leads him to conclude that because nations never
obey the law of love, i.e., sacrifice themselves, that this is prima facie
evidence of the impossibility of nations to obey the law of love* But the
Important q\iestion here is not whether agape is an impossibility fot groups
and nations, but whether the leaders and officials of a nation (since a na¬
tion cannot act of its own free will) "ought to read from the law of love...
the ccmclusion that they should render functioning in these capacities no
longer possible for themselves or others by voluntary suicidal abandon-
31
ment*..." And as Morgenthau rightly notes, the individual may sty for
himself: *Fiat Justitia. pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the
world perish),* but the state has no rl^t to say so in the name of those
32
\dio are in its care."
In fairness to Niebuhr, we must note that there is a passage in his
writings in which he overcomes the difficulty, for he says that
...it is not even ri|^t to insist that every action must conform
to agape, rather than to the norms of relative justice and mutual
love by which life is mcd.ntained and conflicting interests are
arbitrated in history. For as soon as the life and Interests of
others than the agent are Involved in an action or policy, the
sacrifice of these interests ceases to be 'self-sacrifice.' It
may actually become an unjust betrayal of their Interests.33
3J-Ibid.
32Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, i960), p. 10.
33Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. II, 88.
CHAPTER 17:
HISTORY AND THE ILLUSIOK OP SCIENnPIO POLITICS
We live In an Niebuhr writes,
...in:which our social and historical ixaperatives mey be simply;/
defined but not easily achieved. Our task is; to create and re**
create community within the terms set by a technical civilizau^
tiem The constant elaboration of man* s technical skills; has
created a political world community, but this community cannot
be actualized as easily as modern man had hoped.
Modern man has placed his faith in socio-political concepts, profess¬
ing to believe in objectives such as, Hhe democratic wsy of life,* com¬
pletely disregarding the dilemma inherent in such political concepts. What
constitutes, "the democratic way of life?" To Niebuhr, "...the world is di¬
vided between different types of 'democrats,* between those who would sacri¬
fice freedom, or have already sacrificed it, for the sake of an equalitarian
and collectivist democracy and those who would make no sacrifice of any free-
2
dom in the interest of justice."
Our secular age has disavowed the historical religious faiths chiefly
because the tragic view of life implicit in religion is unacceptable to mod¬
em man and religious themes of redemption are considered as irrelevant.
Men interpreted history as moving progressively forward? the redemptive mes¬
sages of religion which offered to man and nations, life through death, and
salvation through repentance, was regarded as irrelevant. It was thought
that, "there was nothing the matter with human life which historical growth.
5could not cure."





The faith of the peist tvo centtiries has not prepared man for the frus¬
trations through which he must live in the next century or tvo. The idea
of progress, in Niehuhr*s eyes, was the unij^ing element in all strands of
modem culture} man had faith in a redemptive history.
This faith, which supposedly made all other interpretations of
life completely incredible, is now progressively disclosing
itself as the most Incredible of all interpretations of life.
This refutation of the cxilture of modem man by contemporary
history may be regarded as the real splrltucQ. crisis of our
day.^
5
Another illusion, according to Niebuhr, which has obscured the fact
that history is creative, yet not redemptive, is that which is closely re~
lated to the idea of progress; it consists of the belief that man can reach
a state of perfection throu^ "scientific objectivity." This represents
an attempt to apply the methods of the nat\iral sciences to the realm of
history. Along with Comte, modem man believes that the scientific age
6
could,solve all problems, "...Including the problem of human community."
Painfully, man has had to learn that history is neither God nor a re¬
deemer. History solves many problems, yet it aggravates rather than miti¬
gates the basic incongruities of existence. History can elevate the drama
of life on hi^er levels, but the essence of the drama must remain the same.
A. The Difference Between Natixre and History
7
"History," Niebuhr says, "is the fmit and the proof of man*s ftreedom.”
Man is involved in the natural flux; history, therefore, has its roots in
Niebuhr, "The Dilemma of Modern Man," p. 206.
5lbid.
^Niebuhr, "Is History Predictable?" The Atlantic, CLVLIV (July, 195^),70.
"^Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York), 19^9)* P» 55
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the natureO. process* But inasmuch as man's capacity to transcend the neces¬
sities of nature permits him to transmute the natural sequence of nature,
man can make and know history. Niebuhr sees history not as constituting a
realm of necessity alone, but as being ccmposed of a curious blend of free¬
dom and necessity. This is what he means when he says that the self is a
creature in, and creator of, the historical process. We shall have more to
say about that later. To properly understand history, is to understand the
uniqueness of the event. History and nature do not constitute one and the
same realm; if history is to be made comprehensible, a sharp distinction
must be made between it and nature.
History is not only more complex than nature, due to the maimer in
which historical patterns are intertwined and superimposed upon each other,
but it cannot be made to conform to logical or natural coherence. If this
be true, one may well ask, what is the basis for historical knowledge, if
the historical process cannot be comprehended by the coherence of nature or
by logic? Niebuhr finds the answer in man's memory. He writes:
Memory is thus that aspect of humem freedom which is most deter¬
minative in the construction of historical reality. It gives
meaning to historical events without reducing them to natural ne¬
cessity and recurrence; and it thereby gives the agent of action
a dimension of freedom in the present moment which proves history
to be a realm of freedom as well as of destiny.8
The uniqueness of an historical event lies in the dramatic encounter
between freedom and destiny. "Memory, in short," Niebuhr notes, "is the
9
fulcrum of freedom for man in history." "That,...is why^the study of his¬




and the human contrivance which entered into present realities, the more do
10
present facts appear in the guise of irrevocable facts of nature."
The past is not made manifest to us simply by memory. Niebuhr points
out that historical decisions, being composed of destiny as well as freedom,
have profound consequences in the present which man’s freedom c8umot revoke.
Actually the past is present to us not only in our memory of its
events but in the Immediacy of the accomplished events which it
places upon our doorsteps. We do not merely remember the acci¬
dent we had in our childhood but we have a sceur upon our fore¬
head as a 'reminder.' ...No statesman in modem Europe can un¬
do the complex of facts which resulted from Hitler's political
adventure, however much he may have freedom to choose between
new alternatives which arise from the irrevocable facts thus cre¬
ated.
1. Man as Creature and Creator of History
We have previously analyzed Niebuhr's doctrine of man in which he em¬
phasized the duality of man's nature, l.e., man is a child of nature and he
transcends nature because of his unique freedom. Similarly, man is to be
understood from the point of history as being a creatixre in, and creator of,
the historical drama. The self's freedom over the natural process enables it
to be a creator of historical events. "Both its memory of past events and
its capacity to project goals transcending the necessities of nature enable
it to create the new level of reality, which we know as human history. But
the self is not simply a creator of this new dimension, for it is also a
12
creature of the web of events, in the creation of which it participates."
^Olbid.
^^Ibid.. pp. 19-20.
12Reinhold Niebuhr, The Self and Dramas of History (New York, 1955),
p. Ul.
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This assertion by Niebuhr has far-reaching political Implications for
he believes that,
The involvement of man in the same historical process in which he
is also an agent must account for the egoistic corruptions of his
Judgments in all human affairs and conflicts. The double rela¬
tion of man to the historical process in which he is both creature
and creator is in fact responsible for many errors in the politi¬
cal theories of modern culture.l3
This is particuleurly true in regard to the creation of community. We
shall explore this problem in greater detail later, but there is a close re¬
lationship between the creation of community and the radical freedom of the
self, which allows it to become a creator of the historical drama, which
calls for a brief discussion at this point.
Communities are artifacts, "...insofar as the form of cohesion and the
lU
integration of the community have been consciously contrived." This view
de-emphaslzes man as creature in .the historical process; he is regarded as
SiD5)ly the creator of history. "The fact is," Niebuhr writes, "that even
the wisest statecraft caumot create social tissue. It can cut, sew and re¬
design social fabric to a limited degree. But the social fabric upon which
15
it works must be ’given'."
2. Voluntarism, Determinism and History
If the role of man as creator of the historical drama has been oversn-
phasized by proponents who believe that community can be created simply by
decree, Niebuhr believes that it has been subjected to a strange ccx&blnation
^%iebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York, 1953),
p. 10.
^^Niebuhr, The Self and Dramas of History, p. 163.
15Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 11.
of detex^nlsm and voluntarism in the social and political philosophies of
the modern period. He cites the laissez-faire theories, "based upon physlo-
cratlc Ideas, and communism as examples. Of the first, he writes:
The tendency to equate history with nature or to confuse the *lavs
of nature* with those of history has given rise, since the French
Enlightenment, to a determinism which minimizes the creative role
of man. The most consistent application of this determinism Is
the economics of laissez-faire, drawn from physlocratlc theory,
and warning men from Interference with the 'natural* processes and
'natural* balances of history.16
"But,** he avers, "the tendency to equate history with nature can also
prompt a contradictory voluntaristic theory according to which man Is called
17
upon to use scientific technics to manage history, as he has nature." The
combination of determinism and voluntarism presupposes an elite who possesses
the omniscience to manage and control historical events. Communism confronts
us with the most frightening display of the compound of determinism and volun¬
tarism.
Modefn communism presents us with a much more dangerous combination
of such determinism and voluntarism. It has a self-appointed elite,
the Communist Party, who, by reason of being the only ones who are
privy to the logic which supposedly determines historical events,
are able to Intervene at the crucial moments to further the logic
and finally to take the heroic step which will Insure not only the
victory of the 'proletariat,' but change the whole human situation
by making man the unambiguous master of historical destiny rather
than merely both creature and creator.lS
Haturedly, "these theories 'violate the dignity* of some menj and they
fall to observe the creaturely limitations of the elite who are assigned to
19
the role of masters of history."
J-^Nleboihr. The Self and Dramas of History, p. Ul.
ITibld.
iQlbld.. p. U2.
19Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 11.
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3. The Complexity of Causation in History
Niebuhr views the study of history as the study of human situations
which are extremely variable. There la such a complex of causation surround.*
ing each historical event that it is impossible for the historian to approx*
20
imate the exactitude of the natural scientist. Each historical event
takes place in a half*dozen or more dimensions, geographical, climatic, ge*
ologlcal, psychological, socleLl, and personal. Because of the many dimen*
sions in which historical events happen, it is possible to correlate events
plausibly in numerous manners. To Niebuhr,
The infinite variety of causal sequences to which every act and
event in history is related makes almost every correlation of
causes sufficiently plausible to be immune to compelling challenge.
Any social theory, therefore, has some kinship with the procedures
of A Rorchach test, which is more revealing about the state of the
patient*s mind who takes it than about the inkspots which his imag*
inatlon interprets in terms of various configurations.
Niebuhr thinks that it is impossible to give a scientifically conclusive
account of the fall of the Roman Empire, or, to use another example, of the
rise of Nazism in Germany, which would call for the rejection of a competing
or contrasting interpretation. He is on solid ground on this particular
point, yet it is obvious that some interpretations are more plausible than
others. He recognizes this when he writes, "obviously, absurd correlations
22
can be ruled out, and flagrant biases can be discovered."
20




k. The Predictihility of History
Nlehiihr believes that no scientific investigations of past behavior
can beccaae the basis of predictions of future behavior. "Even if an his¬
torian is able to establish causal sequences after the event, he cannot
make any generalizations about the past the basis of predictions of future
23
actions and events." He ceumot do so, because he not only lacks suffi¬
cient knowledge of the complex cav^es of past events, but he cannot accu¬
rately predict which of the many tendencies which determine actions, have
2U
the dominant Influence in the lives of individuals and nations.
However, there are discernible patterns in history, therefore, there
are probable events. "But," he cautions us, "we can never speak of future
25
events as 'inevitable.'"
Because history remains unpredictable, Niebuhr is of the opinion that
an historian nmst represent something of a dramatist as well as scientist.
On this point, he wr0es;
He must be a scientist in his search for the facts. But he must
have artistic imagination to discern the dramatic pattern which
is spelled out by the facts. If he imagines himself merely a
scientist, he will suffer from the illusion that he coxild predict
the future if only he knew all the facts. If he seeks to become
a 'philosopher of history,' he will be under the illusion that he
has discerned some permanent metaphysical pattern under the vast
vauriety of historical events. For while there are undoubtedly
historical patterns, every effort of philosophers to interpret
events on the basis of these alleged patterns has resulted in er¬
ror and confusion.26
^^Niebuhr, The Self and Dramas of History, p. 45.
g^Ibid.
^^Niebur, "Is History Predictable?" p. 69.
g^ibid.
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Nlebvihr avers that historical miscalciilations can he attributed to mis¬
taken smalogies. History is replete with recurrences; therefore, it con¬
tains many analogies. For, "If this were not so, no 'lessons' could be
learned from history. But since history also elaborates endless dramatic
variations, none of the analogies are exact enough to become the basis for
27
prediction." In short, Niebuhr's position on this question is that,
"There are no simple recurrences in history and, therefore, no analogies be¬
tween sequences in various periods of history which could compel us to ex¬
cept a proposition that a given policy in a certain period will have slml-
28
lar effects as the same policy in another period."
He argues that Professor Toynbee's analogy of the conflict between
Eastern and Western Christendom and the present conflict between the West
and Russia is Illuminating, but that it fails to fully illuminate the cur-
29
rent conflict. This is so because of the many novel factors which enter
into the present conflict; "...the analyses of historical patterns must lack
the scientific precision which characterizes the conclusions of the natural
sciences..., they must fail in the test of predictability which is the hall-
30
mark of any exact science."
Validity of the Social Sciences
Niebuhr's insistence on the point that history does not lend itself to
prediction of future events is not to be interpreted to mean that he believes
2Tibid.
2®Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problans. p. 8U.
29lbid.
30Niebuhr, The Self and Dramas of History, p. U5.
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history or the other social sciences to be Invalid. He says:
There are of cotorse valid social or historical sciences. They are
most legitimate vhen the scientists know themselves to be hlstor^
Ians rather than natural scientists; and therefore recognize that
their generalizations are hazardous and speculative. The real
historians have an Instinct for the peculiar quality of history
and know the hazards of predictions of the future.31
The historian cannot obtain the same degree of objectivity as the natu<>
ral scientist for he Is Involved In the temporal flux and must observe It
from a particular locus. He operates from within his own framework of mean¬
ing and his construction and Interpretations of events are conditioned.
Statesmen who dwell on problems arising from the political and social conse¬
quences of atomic energy operate under the same limitations. They will, he
says, "betray 'British,' 'American,' or 'Busslan' bias, not because they are
less Intelligent than the scientists but because they are forced to approach
the Issue In terms of their responsibility to their nations. Their formula¬
tion of a solution Is Intimately and organically related to the hopes, fears,
32
and ambitions of nations."
Elaborating further, he writes:
If It Is historical rather than biological or geological sequence
which Is under Inquiry, there Is no strictly 'scientific' method
of Judging the motives which prompt human actions or of comparing
competing vlte^.ltles In history. Every Judgment of fact Is also
a value Judgment, presupposing a noxm. I^e norm Is Itself his¬
torically conditioned, and the application of the norm to the
stuff of history Is t^ce conditioned.
This fact does not Invalidate the social and hlstorlced sciences
or prove that they ought to be reduced to statistical proportions
In order to become purer sciences. ....We must continue to seek
to understand what things are and how they came to be what they
31lbld.
32Nlebuhr, "The Dilemma of Modem Man," p. 208
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are in history as well as in nature. But there is no magic in
either logic or the scientific method which will coerce men or
nations to subordinate the particular to the universal interest.
Reason in history remains permanently ambiguous, being both the
servant and the master of all of history’s vitalities,33
C, Evaluation
In this chapter, we have been primarily concerned with Niebuhr's con¬
ception of what constitutes the historical realm, how nature and history
differ, the difficulty of applying the scientific method of the natural sci¬
ences to the social and historical sciences. We have endeavored to show
that in Niebuhr's Judgment, ",,,the tragic events of modern history have ne¬
gated practically every presupposition upon which modern cult\ire was
3k
built,”
We have pointed out, what to Niebuhr, are the shortcomings of any polit¬
ical theory which overestimates man's role as creator of, and underestimates
his role as a creature in the historical drama. The first engenders false
hopes that man can create community by decree, that all social and political
problems which plague man are solvable if only man would "get together” as
they do in solving problems in the natural sciences. The second leads to a
too complete Identification of the historical process with that of the natural.
It seeks to manage man as nature is managed.
The difficulty in attributing causations to the events of history has
been discussed. In addition, we have labored to show that Niebvihr regards
the historical realm to be impossible of lending itself to predictions of fu-
33ibid,. p, 207.
3^iebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York, 19^0), p, l88.
turo events, which more than argr other factor, pinpoints the unscientific
character of mch of the social sciences. Yet, as we have shown, his cri¬
tique of the scientific method as applied to the social sciences, does not
invalidate them, but merely depicts the limits to which it can be onplcyed
when social, not natural phenomena, are being investigated.
Our comments will center around two points* (1) The distinction!he
makes between!nature and history; and (2) his conception of the meaning of
history.
In his analysis of the difference between nature and history, Niebuhr
arguessfor a sharp distinction based upon the element of human freedom which
characterizes the historical realm. How valid is such a distinction? For
purposes of analysis, the distincthbp obviously offers certain advantages,
but does not the distinction^ when made absolute, obscure the relationship
between nat^al and social phenomena?
The distinctness of the words * social’ and ’natural’ inevitably
suggests that the subject matters denoted by them must be mutu¬
ally/^ exclusive. Yet few seem willing to maintain such a sharps
dichotomy between natural and social facts as to call the latter
im- or non-natiiral. Social facts and the human beings between
whom thqy take place are located in physical time and space. De¬
prive these social facts of their physical elementa or dimensions
and th^ lose their usual meaning and cease to have reference to
anything existing.55
History, since Christ, represents to Niebuhr, an interim between the
disclosure and the fulfillment of its meaning. History is not redemptive;
it can only fulfill itself from a locus which is "beyond history." A mean¬
ingful history is associated with the final trivimph of good over evil. Bui
is not the struggle against evil wlthim history meaningful? Aside from the
55Morris R, Cohen^ Reason and Nature (Glencoe, 1951)» P» 55^»
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Chrlstlem faith which offers salvation to the faithful at a point heyond
history, Niehuhr has no assurances that there is a locus of time "beyond
history." In other words, "beyond history" is a Christian presupposition
which is not demonstrable. According to Daniel Williams, Niebuhr
...finds meaning ultimately only in complete victory over evil.
Therefore history depends upon something 'beyond history' for
its meaning; because there is no complete victory in history.
Profound liberalism always regards the struggle with evil as
meaningful in Itself. Some liberalism, it is true, found mean¬
ing in history only by believing in a complete victory over
evil in time, the building of the Kingdom of God on earth. But
the more realistic element in the liberal spirit was not so con¬
cerned about complete triumph. Can we not believe in an actual
redemptive working of God in history without falling into the
utopianism which Niebuhr rightly exposes and rejects?36
3^Daniel D. Williams, "Niebuhr and Liberalism," Reinhold_Niebuhr; His
Religious. Social, and Political Thought, eds. Kegley and Bretall, p, 207.
CHAPTER V
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
A, Political Idealism and Political Realism
Niebuhr discerns tvo general types of approach to the problems of In¬
ternational politics. The first Is the historical and realistic school;
the second Is rationalistic In method and Idealistic In Its outlook. In the
realm of political phenomena, these terms are not analagous to their meta¬
physical connotations. "In political and moral theory," writes Niebuhr,
"'realism' denotes the disposition to take all factors In a social and po¬
litical situation, which offer resistance to established norms Into account,
1
particularly the factors of self-interest and power." Idealism, in con¬
trast, Is "characterized by loyalty to moral norms and Ideals, rather than
to self-interest, whether Individual or collective. It Is, In the opinion
of its critics, characterized by a disposition to Ignore or be Indifferent
to the forces in human life which offer res Istwee to universally valid
2
Ideals and norms." As defined by Niebuhr, realism and ideeJLlsm emphasize
dispositions of the theorists or writers rather than doctrines; therefore,
the definitions are not precise.
Niebuhr has employed the scriptual designations—children of light, and
children of darkness—to further distinguish between idealists and realists.
He writes:
The children of darkness are evil because they know no law beyond
the self. They are wise, though evil, because they understand the
%ieb\ihr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 119.
2lbld.. p. 120.
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power of self-interest. The children of light are virtuous because
they have some conception of a higher law than their own will.
They are usually foolish because th^ do not know the power of self-
will. They underestimate the peril of anarchy in both the nation¬
al and the international community.^
The problem of the creation of a world community will be discxissed be¬
low, but, at this point, let us examine one aspect of the consequences of
idealistic and realistic dispositions on this problem. The Idealists, in
Niebuhr's opinion, tend to view history from the perspective of the moral and
social imperatives which a rationalistic appraisal of the situation generates.
He writes:
...they look at the world and decide its social and economic prob¬
lems demand and require a 'federation of the world.' They think
of such a federation not primarily in terms of the complex econom¬
ic and social Interest and vitalities, which must be brought into
and held in a tolerable equilibrium. They are on the whole con¬
tent to state the ideal requirements of the situation in as rigor¬
ous terms an possible.^
On the other hand, Niebuhr avers that the realistic school does not deny
the necessity nor the possibility of the creation of an international communi¬
ty. But, he says,
...it views the task of realizing them in the light of its knowl¬
edge of the stubborn Inertia of hTiman history. It wants to know
how nations are to be beguiled into a limitation of their sover¬
eign rights, considering that national pride and parochial self-
sufficiency are something more than the mere fruit of Ignorance
but recurring forces in all efforts at social cohesion.5
Believing that no historical process has conformed to the pattern mapped
out by the idealists, Niebuhr says the difficult task of world organization
^Niebuhr, The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness (New York,
194U), pp. 10-11.




must be attempted from hlstorlceil realism. Yet, with characteristic dialec¬
tical synthesis, he tells us, ”that the truth does not He simply on the
side of the reaHsts. Without an admlxtxire of the temper and the Insights
of the other school, there voxild he no genuine advance In social organize-
6
tlon at all."
One crucial, complex Issue Is Involved In the differences which tend to
polarize the thou^ts and viewpoints of the two schools. It Is the perennial
problem of power. The realists know that history Is no simple rational pro¬
cess, but a vital one.
Some dominant power lies at the center of every social organiza¬
tion. Some balance of power Is the -basis of whatever Justice Is
achieved In human relations. Where the disproportions of power
are too great and where an ec[ulllbrlum of soclcd forces are lack¬
ing, no mere rational or moral demands can achieve Justice.7
The realists are well aware of the problems of power, but, to Niebuhr,
they tend to Interpret It In too cynical terms. At times, they forget that
political power Is compounded of many forces besides the physical Ingredient.
"They do not fully appreciate that a proper regard for moral aspirations is a
source of political prestige, and that this prestige Is Itself an Indlspen-
8
sable source of power."
B. Christian Realism
We have had occasion to state that Niebuhr's political orientation Is




been tremendous and prominent thinkers have acknowledged their indebtedness
to him* The following comment by* Professor Kenneth Thompson is representa¬
tive:
Undoubtedly it is not without significance that these authorities
admittedly owe an important intellectual debt to the Protesteint
theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, who as early as 1932 in Moral Man
and Immoral Society elaborated a realistic theory of internation¬
al politics. Not long ago Kennan in surveying the growth of in¬
terest among the small group of responsible theorists identified
Niebuhr as the precursor of the so-called realists or, in Ken-
nan's words, 'the father of all of us.'^
There is a Juncture, however, where Niebuhr parts company with the re¬
alistic school. The point at which the divergence of views takes place is
Niebuhr's insistence upon the introduction of norms into the sphere of in-
temationsd. politics. He levels the charge that
A realism becomes morally cynical or nihilistic when it assumes
that the universal characteristic in htunan behavior must also be
regarded as normative* Good and evil are not determined by some
fixed structinre of human existence. Man, according to the bibli-
Cfd. view, may use his freedom to make himself falsely the center
of existence; but this does not change the fact that love rather
them self-love is the law of his existence in the sense that man
can only be heathy and his communities at peace if man is drawn
out of himself...10
As one of Niebuhr's interpreters puts it, "Moral cynicism does not arise
from a clear recognition of the f8u;t that we must come to terms with the
brutal facts of existence, it arises from our investing them with normative
11
character."
^Kenneth W. Thompson, "Beyond National Interest: A Critical Evaluation
of Reinhold Niebuhr's Theory of International Politics," The Review of Poli¬
tics, XVII (April, 1955), l68.
l^iebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p, 130.
^%arland. The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, p, 19^.
46
Niebuhr, then, Is a realist who seeks to subject the harsh and brutal
realities of political phenomena to a norm which is transcendent to them.
This is his Christian realism.
C. Power Politics and the Balance of Power
The concept of the balance of power is one of the vital precepts of the
realistic school. To Niebuhr, the balance of power is necessary in order to
achieve some degree of political Justice; particularly is this true on the
national level where different groups are in contention. However, on the in¬
ternational level, he holds that nations can ultimately transcend the balance
of power concept, for the balance itself constitutes a form of managed an¬
archy. "Justice," he writes "is basically dependent upon a balance of power.
Whenever an Individual or a group or a nation possesses undue power and when¬
ever this power is not checked by the possibility of criticizing and resist-
12
Ing it, it grows Inordinate." Furthermore,
All political Justice is achieved by coercing the anarchy of col¬
lective self-interest into some kind of decent order by the most
attainable balance of power. Such a balance, once achieved, can
be stabilized, embellished, and even on occasion, perfected by
more purely moral considerations* But there has never been a
scheme of Justice in history which did not have a balance of pow¬
er at its foundations.13
A balance of power is not to be confused with the harmony of love. It
is different from and inferior to love, yet^ given the sinfulness of man, it
is a basic condition of love. There is a process of interaction between
love and the balance of power, for, Niebuhr says, "...without love the fric-
12Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics. p« 26.
13lbid.. p. 104.
tions and tensions of a l)alance of power would bec(»ie intolerable. But
without the balance of power even the moat loving relations may degenerate
into unjust relations, and love may become the screen which hides injus-
lU
tice," The law of love which operates as an indiscriminate principle of
criticism prevents man's pride, vindictiveness and self-righteousness from
corrupting his endeavors to achieve Justice.
Has the balance of power secured peace on the international level?
Historically, the period tram, the end of the Napoleonic War to the beginning
of the World War I is conceded to be one of such periods. Niebuhr accepts
this When he writes: "The peace of Europe before the World War rested upon a
balance of power. It was destroyed by the mutual fears and animosities cre-
15
ated by the tensions of such a balance."
Niebuhr chides the realistic school for cherishing the belief "that
l6
world polities cannot rise higher than the balance-of-power principle."
Believing that no real unity among nations is possible, the realistic school
wishes to mitigate world tensions by the construction of an adequate system
which would most nearly equilibrate power among the contending states. Nie¬
buhr admits that "Such a policy, which holds factors in the world situa-
17
tion in the most possible equipose, can undoubtedly mitigate anarchy." He
conceives of the balance-of-power system as representing a kind of managed
anarchy, in which anarchy in the end, always topple manag^ent. This is the
^^Ibid.. p. 26.
^^Reinhold Niebuhr, Reflections On the End of An Era (New York, 193^),
p. 2U6 .




A balance of power Implies a conflict of wills and contest of in¬
terests in which injustice is prevented because contending forces
cure fairly evenly matched. Such a procedure does not remove the
root of conflict which is to be found in the corporate egoism of
contending groups,
Not only does the cause of the conflict remain, but the equilibrium is dis¬
turbed by the states which are never satisfied with their particular posi¬
tions and seek to improve them.
Niebuhr is cognizant of the defects of the balance-of-power system and
has pointed out some of these defects. It does not cure the evils which gave
rise to the need for the balance; it is potential anarchy; and each nation
feeling Insecure with the balance, seeks to Improve its own position, thus
distxirbing the equilibrium. He does not totally condemn the system, for he
tells us that
Despite its defects the policy of the balance of power is not as
iniquitous as Idee^ists would have us believe. For even the most
perfectly organized society must seek for a decent equilibrium of
the vitalities and forces under its organizations. If this is not
done, strong disproportions of power develop.,,,^9
How does the so-called idealistic school view the b8J.ance-of-power system.
Ve believe that Professor Frank Tannenbaum qualifies as an idealist in terms
of Niebuhr's definitions. He writes:
A great debate on the character and purpose of American foreign pol¬
icy has been precipitated by those who would persuade out people to
abandon their humanitarian and pacific traditions and frankly adopt
the doctrines of power polltiees and the balance of power as the bai-
sls of their foreign policy. This doctrine is confessedly, nay,
gleefully, amoral,20
iBniebuhr, Reflections On the End of An Era, p, 243.
19Niebuhr, The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness, p, 174,
SOpreuik Tannebaum, "The Balance of Power Versus The Coordinate State,"
Political Science Quarterly. LXVII (June, 1952), 173.
It is Professor Tannentaum* s tellef that the realistic school thiiaks
that it is necessary that relations among states he built upon the princi¬
ple of the balance of power. The idealistic school, on the other hand,
"...believes that it is possible and desirable, if man wishes to save him¬
self from destruction, to organize International relations on the basis of
21
the coordinate state." We may pause at this point to consider what is
the coordinate state. It has nothing to do with wealth, power, size, popu-
22
latlon or culture; it "implies a position of equal dignity."
It has everything to do with the recognition that coiiq>romise is
a continuing means of non-violent friction (peace) ...It is on¬
ly if all the states continue to have equal dignity among them¬
selves that changes in power and wealth can be absorbed with¬
out undue violence. That is the essence of the coordinate
st9.te.23
To Tannenbam, the balance of power school derives its principles from
the modern European state system; the idealistic school, which endorses the
coordinate state proposal, derives its principles and conclusions from the
following sources: (l) the experience of the federal system in the United
States, (2) the Organization of American States, (3) the British Common¬
wealth of Nations, and (U) the federal history of Switzerland.
Professor Tannenbaum's approach is based upon creating community by con¬
stitution. Niebuhr warns us against this simple approach to International
commxmity. He writes:
In a day as tragic as our own it would be pleasant to believe that
there is a simpler way than the tortuous process by which the na¬





short cuts are illusory. Constitutional questions, "before com¬
munity is established, are divisive rather than unifying. How,
for instance, would we decide how many votes Denmark,,,,and the
United States should have in a World Federalist senate? ,,,the
great moral issue for Americans is how a rich and powerful na¬
tion relates itself to a weak and impoverished world. Not in
terms of ultimate constitutional arrangements, but in terms of
immediate political problems,
25
Professor Hans Morgenthau has made a direct reply to Professor Tan-
nenbaum’s "coordinate" state proposal. Concerning the political entities
cited as examples of the coordinate state in operation, he says, "The only
thing that these four examples seem to have really in common is the legal
stipulation of the equality of the members of the respective systems and
this characteristic is not peculiar to them, but a general principle of in-
26
ternational law applicable to all sovereign states,"
D, The National Interest
The reaUsts, partly in response to the vague and abstract proposals of
international idealism, and partly because of their awareness of the constan¬
cy with which the self-interest of nations is actually invoked in internation¬
al relations, have sought to make the national interest the fundamental prin¬
ciple for conducting foreign affairs, "Foreign policies," former Chief Jus¬
tice Charles Evans Hughes stated, "are built upon abstractions. They ea*e
the positive result of practical conceptions of national interest arising
pll
Niebuhr, Love and Justice, p, 217,
25see "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States,"
The American Political Science Review. XLVI (December, 1952), 96I-88,
^^Ibld,. p, 968,
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from some Immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspec-
27
tive." Admiral Alfred T. Mahan states the same idea in more emphatic lan¬
guage: "Self-interest is not only a legitimate, but a fundamental cavise for
national policy; one vhlch needs no cloak of hypocrisy...it is vain to expect
governments to act continuously on aty other ground than national interest.
They have no right to do so, being agents and not principles."
The national interest is frequently referred to but rarely defined by
those who seek to make it the underlying principle for conducting a nation's
foreign policy. Hiebuhr does not define the concept, but seems to equate it
vlth the self-interest of a nation. The concept is difficult to define be¬
cause it is usually invoked to justify every action a nation takes vhlch may
affect another nation.
In general it may be said that the national interest of a country
is vhat its governmental leaders and in large degree also vhat its
people consider at any time to be vital to their national indepen¬
dence, way of life, territorial security, and economic welfare.
They are those outlooks, convictions, positions, and goals which
are held to be sufficiently important to the existence, growth, se¬
curity, and well-being of a nation to; have the weight of the state
thrown behind their advancement and protection.29
Vhat is national interest? As a realist, Niebuhr accepts national in¬
terest as an inevitable fact of international politics, but as a Christian,
he rejects it as a norm. Throxighout much of his writings, we are confronted
with his recognition of the national interest as a fundamental guide in the
^"^Quoted in Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York,
1934), p. 1.
28lbid.
29iiorman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, International Politics
(New York, 1954), p. 309.
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formulation of policies. In one place he writes;
We must be constantly reminded of the simple fact that no nation
is so generoiis as to sacrifice its interest to others. If it is
wise enough to find the point of concurrence between its own in¬
terests and those of others, it clouds its reputation for wisdom
when it makes excessive moral claims for its prudence,30
"It is foolish," he tells us, "to hope that America could bear its
present responsibilities in the world without regard to national self-in-
31
terest," And in numerous works he has cited the dictum of George Washing¬
ton—that no nation can be tanisted too far beyond its own interest.
Yet, to recognize the prevalence of the national interest is not to
Justify it morally. As a Christian realist he Insists that, "The children
of light must be armed with the wisdom of the children of darkness but re¬
main free from malice. They must know the power of self-interest in human
32
society without giving it moral Justification."
An example of the vague and abstract principles that the Idealists
would base out foreign affairs upon is Tannenbaiua's assertion that our for¬
eign policy
...derives from the assumption that security rests upon coopera¬
tion, that cooperation is possible only among equals, that equal¬
ity eliminates the basic reason for political disruption because
those equal politically are coordinate in dignity and in rank.33
^^Niebuhr, "The Conditions of our Survival," The Virginia Quarterly Re-
view, XXVI (Autumn, 1950), 483.
3%iebuhr, "Hazards and Resources," The Virginia Quarterly Review. XXV
(Spring, 1949), p. 203.
2%ieb\dir, The Children of Light and The Children of BtSrkness. p, 4l,
^^Tannenbaum, "The American Tradition in Foreign Relations," Foreign
Affairs. XXX (October, 1951). 4?.
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He would further have ua believe that "The very essence of American interna-
3U
tional relations rests upon the idea of a cooperative relationship.” Pro>
fessor Tannenbaum's assertion overlooks or simply Ignores the obvious fact
that a great deal of cooperation among unequal states takes place. And fur¬
thermore, constitutional schemes, as Niebuhr points out, will not solve the
problem of equality among states.
George G. Kerman has labeled this type of approach to policy formula-
35
tion as the "legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems.”
He advocates a return to the concept of the national interest as the corner¬
stone of our foreign policy. ”He does not,” Niebuhr writes, "intend to be
morally cynical in the advocacy of this course. He believes that a modest
awareness that our own interests represent the limit of our competence should
prompt such a policy ...yet his solution is wrong. For egotism is not the
36
proper cure for an abstract and pretentious idealism.”
Niebuhr avers that a too consistent self-interest on the part of a na¬
tion will in the end militate against its Interest because it will not do Jus¬
tice to the larger interests, which are inextricably bound with the interests
37
of other nations. In other words, the national interest can be defined too
narrowly. The preoccupation by a nation with its own interests will cause it
to fall to recognize the mutuality of interests that it shares with other
nations.
34bid.
^^George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy. 1900-1950 (New York, 195^) p« 93.
3%lebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York, 1952), p. lU8.
^"^Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 136.
Moral cynicism is an outgrowth of a nation's preoccupation with its
self-interest. And this cynicism can and does degenerate into moral preten¬
sion, for nations insist that they cannot act beyond their interest; yet
they always invoke some higher moral principle when they do act. ”A modem
nation," he tells us, "does not dare to go to war for reasons other than
those of self-interest and cannot conduct the war without claiming to be mo-
38
4;ivated by higher motives than those of self-interest."
If self-interest is, as Niebuhr informs us, inevitable among nations,
what does he propose to mitigate the situation, or what other alternative is
there for nations which will lead to Justice without the nation sacrificing
itself or destroying another to preserve itself?
It is necessary...to draw upon another moral and spiritual resource
to widen the conception of interest. The citizens of a nation must
have loyalties and responsibilities to a wider system of values
than that of the national interest—to a civilization for instance,
to a system of Justice, and to a community of free nations. These
moral concerns will serve to leaven the mind of a nation and pre¬
vent a national community from defining its interest too narrowly.39
E. Evaluation
The impact of Niebuhr's thought upon the realistic school, as we have
had occasion to point out, has been widespread and profound. His analysis of
the role of power and Interest in the international realm of politics leaves
very little to be desired. He has constructed a realistic theory of interna¬
tional relations based upon the empirical behavior of states in which the con-
3^iebuhr, The Children of Light and The Children of Dstrkness. p. 170.
39]Jiebuhr, Niebuhr On Politics, eds., H. R, Davis suid R. C. Gk)od (New
York, i960), p. 335T
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cept of national interest is central. After haying constructed a realistic
theory of international relations, Nlehuhr seeks a normative theory, heyond
the national interest, "in order to avert what he has called the abyss of
UO
moral cynicism inherent in a merely rational theozy." It is at this point
that ve encounter two dilemmas involved in his attempt to transcend the na¬
tional interest.
To begin with, Niebiahr attempts to achieve a synthesis of realism and
idealism, embodying the "temper and the insights" of idealism with the wis¬
dom of realism within the framework of a normative theory. He does not,
therefore, formulate precise definitions of realism and idealism, but views
them as dispositions either to recognize or to ignore the factors (of which
self-interest and power are the most important) which offer resistance to
established norms.
The test of a scientific theory is its capacity for bringing order
and meaning to a mass of data which would otherwise remain unre¬
lated. It is legitimate to ask whether the concepts of idealism
or realism as formulated and applied by Niebuhr contribute more to
this end than the definitions of Other political scientists who
conceive of politics, as distinct from economics or aesthetics, as
the pursuit of interest defined in terms of power.
If realism is the disposition to take into account those factors in a social
and political situation which offer resistance to established norms, then the
central q.uestion is: what are those "established norms" and how cem we de¬
termine their applicability to specific cases of disputes? "Is it not true
that norms like equality become in the political arena objects of endless
42
contention, rationalization, and self-deception?"




A second dilemma Involves Niebuhr's conception of justice.
Niebuhr conceives of justice in social and political ethics as in¬
volving 'the harmony of the whole which does not destroys the vi¬
tality of the parts.' The criterion of moral value becomes the
freedom of each unique part to assert its vitality; equality and
liberty are the informiing and regulative principles of justice.^5
But equality and liberty are never simple possibilities because of the ami-
biguity/which power end coercion! introduce into politics. And since na^
tions cannot act except in regard to their national interest, what is the
essential role of justice in establishiz^ the "harmony of the whole which
does not destroy the vitality of the parts?" Kenneth Thompson writes;
Niebuhr's.critics can legitimately ask what role is played by jus¬
tice or. equalityror llberty.’^lf the highest morality-possible for
nations is, not a sacrifice of its interests to maintain other
nations, but an effort to fii;d the point of concurrence between
its interests and those of others*^
In other words, the justice of which Niebuhr speaks is actually- achieved by
statesmen acting in response to the national interest of their particular
country; but in his analysis, Niebuhr denies the possibility of this. "Nie¬
buhr questions whether statesmen actii^g solely from self-interest are capable
of discovering mutual interests unless th^ are motivated 1y a spirit of jus-
45
ties of sense of obligation to a wider community,"
In his effort to establish a normative theory beyond the national inter¬
est, Niebuhr does not wholly succeed; "Tet if Niebuhr as failed to transcend
the tragic paradoxes of politics, he has clarified and illuminated the prob-
M





AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY; THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The United States» one of the greatest powers of the modern world, is
confronted by all the responsibilities which any nation that wields such
power must assiime. Power begets responsibilities; great power begets great
responsibilities. ’’For the performance of these responsibilities,” Niebuhr
says, "the United States is equipped by only a few decades of experience and
1
a tradition; the liberal-democratic tradition." Because our past experi¬
ences have been relatively brief as a guide in the realm of international
affairs, we have tended to rely almost exclusively upon the latter.
Niebuhr is of the opinion that the stream of liberal democratic theory
of foreign affairs runs deeply in the consciousness of American life and
thought. The theory has two main emphases which he analyzes as:
(1) an emphasis on the integrity and autonomy of the nation, and
(2) a vague universalism or consideration of the ’community of
mankind* which leaves little room for the configtirations of pow¬
er and authority which develop in history between the nation and
the universal community.2
The adoption by the United States of the vague universalism Inherent in
the liberal democratic theory of international affairs is, to Niebuhr,
"...significant, and possibly dangerous, because it has become the official
or semi-official theory of one of the two great hegemonic powers of the
3
world." It has caused the United States to shirk the responsibilities to
which her position as one of the two imperial powers of the modern world en-






titles her. In short, the United States has delegated its responsibilities
to the United Nations, which, in Niebuhr's eyes, "is not so much a super-
h
government as a forum organ for international diplomacy." As a case in
point, Niebuhr cites the 1958 Suez crisis. President Elsenhower, in a tele¬
vision address to the nation on February 20, 1957, is quoted as saying,
...the United States fully realized that the military action
against Egypt resulted from grave and repeated provocations; but
I also said that the use of military force to solve internation¬
al disputes could not be reconciled with the principles and pur¬
poses of the United Nations, to which we have all subscribed.5
Britain, France and Israel capltxilated to the demands of the United Na¬
tions because the United States sided with Russia in ordering them out. At
the same time, notes Niebuhr, the Russians were brutally suppressing the
Hungarian revolt; a resolution passed by the United Nations condemning the
Soviets for their actions was ineffective. Russia was powerful enough to
defy the United Nations; whereas Israel was forced to cede the territoiy
wrested from Egypt during the abortive invasion becatise it was weak. Eisen¬
hower's insistence, Niebuhr avers, that the moral and political prestige of
the United Nations was at stake "...obscures the* power factors which are
bound to be operative in any situation but particularly in one which the in¬
ternational organization has no power except that which it is endowed by the
6
concurrence of the powerful nations."
Niebuhr does not believe that the unlversallsm Inherent in liberal de¬





above those of the nation. This is the case for ’’...its characteristic pol¬
icies of assuring both order and Justice by a check upon power and by an
equilibrivoa of power do not apply except in a highly integrated parochial or
7
national community."
We shall now investigate the sources or the historical roots of the
liberal dsaocratic tradition which, Niebuhr asserts, is incapable of dealing
with the realities of power in communities above that of the nation.
A. The Sources of the Liberal Democratic Tradition
8
Niebuhr distinguishes four sources of the liberal democratic concept
of foreign relations. The first is derived from the French Revolution and
the political doctrines of Rousseau. The second source emanated from the na¬
tionalistic idealism of Germany and Italy, embodying the romantic idealism of
Herder and the moralistic idealism of Mazzlnl. The third source is to be
found in the liberal democratic tradition of Britain which, says Niebuhr,
differed from the other sources because Britain possessed an empire, and,
therefore, "the prejudices of liberal democracy against empire made for a
combination of idealistic tuid realistic appraisers of problems of foreign
9
policy, which we find lacking in the other sources...." The fotirth sovtrce
is to be found in the historical devel<^ment of America which "...was so
free of the problems and turmoils of Europeem International relations as to






behavior which characterize the purest forms of irresponsible idealism."
Excluding Britain which possessed cm empire and wielded Imperial pow¬
ers, Niebuhr finds the dominant characteristic common to the sources of the
liberal d^ocratic tradition, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth cen¬
turies, to be an indifference to any form of community above the level of
the nation and below the level of the community of mankind. He advances
three probable reasons for this consistency: (l) liberal democracy, as in
Britain, wcm the product of cm established state; (2) in the United States,
liberal democracy and the national spirit were born concurrently; and (3)
the two (liberal democracy cmd the national spirit) in France, appecured to
be coterminous, thou^ later events proved they were not* "In any case"
Niebuhr writes, "democracy developed within the confines of the nation¬
state and cmsumed the integrcQ. community as the ultimate community, except
11
for its vague consciousness of the community of mankind.**
It is clear to Niebuhr that the liberal democratic tradition has failed
to provide an effective bcme for coping with the power dilemma in the inter¬
national arena. Its presuppositions were grounded in the belief that the na¬
tion state was the ultimate level of community; its espousal of community
above the nation resulted in a vaguely conceived "community of mankind" much
too naive to be realized. Much of our frustrations in foreign affairs is at¬
tributable to the liberal democratic tradition, because, in Niebuhr's analysis.
The variations in the pattern of international community vary end¬
lessly. But the fixed pattern in all these variations is a com¬
bination of dominion and community above the level of the nation
^°Ibid.* pp. 182-3.
^^Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires* pp. l83-*^.
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and below the level of the eomrounltj of mankind. It is safe to
predict that no future historjr will annul this pattern though it
meqr produce hitherto unknown variations in the pattern.
F. Conservatism, Liberalism and American Foreign Policy
Having analyzed the historical roots of American foreign policy and the
sources from which they emanated, we shall now consider two schools of oppos¬
ing political philosophies—conservatism and liberalism—and their impact on
American foreign policy. Before attonpting an analysis of the roles of con¬
servatism and liberalism in the realm of American foreign affairs, we diall
first wrestle with the connotations which the terms conv^. In this insteuice,
Niebuhr is not concerned with conservatism or liberalism which reflect moods
or ideologies, one defending the status quo, and the other seeking to leave
it behind, but with the conservatism and liberalism which, to him, are cogent
political philosophies.
"In the broadest sense," he writes, "liberalism is identified with the
rise of a modem technical society availing Itself of democratic political
15
forms and of capitalist economic institutions.* However, in modern techni¬
cal societies, liberalism has achieved two contradictory definltionst on the
one hand, it represents the philosop]:^ of non-intervention in the ecoziomle
sphere, while on the other, it is descriptive of the strategy of those who
seek liy political means to regulate economic life, so that minimum standards
of security' and welfare may be established.
^Ibid., p. 200.
^^Reinhold Niebuhr, "Liberalism: Illusions and Realities," The New Repub¬
lic, July 4, 1955» P« ^
62
Compoxmdlng the confusion, liberalism is Identified with the political
philosophy of the French Revolution. From these roots Niebuhr asserts that
liberalism acquired a special connotation as
...a philosophy of life which did not take the factors of interest
and power seriously, which expected all parochial loyalties to be
dissolved in more universal loyalties; and which was Indifferent
to organically or historically established loyalties and rights
under the illusion that it would be simple for rational man to de¬
vise more ideal communities and rights.1*^
Conservatism presents no less a difficulty in attempts at an adequate
definition. "Perhaps," Niebuhr says, "it is as useless to define the ideal
15
conservatism as to restore exact meaning to the word liberal." But where¬
as conservatism cannot be pardoned as an ideological defense of the status
quo, those aspects of the creed bequeathed by western civilization, particu¬
larly as manifested in British history, must be preserved.
This creed emphasized historical rather than abstract^ modes of so¬
cial engineering, and recognized the perennial source of recalci¬
trance to moral norms in. human life. It was therefore intent upon
developing politics as the art of the possible, being cautious not
to fall into worse forms of injustice in the effort to eliminate
old ones.l^ *
The conservatism which Niebuhr expounds is deeply embedded in the aris¬
tocratic traditions of Europe. He thinks that its superiority in foreign
affairs is the result of ages of responsibility in the field. The conserva¬
tive creed, to Niebuhr, is most eloquently expressed by Edmund Burke in his
Reflections On the French Revolution.
^^Ibid.. p. 12.




’'American conservatism," Nietiihr categorically states j "has been par¬
ticularly inept in dealing with the foreign policy issues which confront our
17
nation." On the other hand, liberalism, despite its weaknesses in under¬
standing foreign policy, "has nevertheless produced in Wilson and Roosevelt,
the two great architects of a responsible foreign policy, and has guided our
nation in assuming responsibilities proportioned to its power in the world
18
community."
As evidences of American conservatism’s failure to grapple with the bru¬
tal realities pf power and to assume responsibilities, Niebuhr writes;
The Republican opposition to Roosevelt came within one vote of de¬
stroying our inchoate army before World War II. It fought the
Lend-Lease Plan, which was probably Roosevelt’s most imaginative
contribution to Allied victory, since it saved our Allies from
collapse before we entered the conflict.
The accomplishments of Wilson and Roosevelt can only partly be attri¬
buted to their political genius because Roosevelt’s successor, "who wm by
general consent no political genius, made the hard decisions required by the
peril in which the nation stood... He was opposed on all of these decisions
by American conservatism, which exhibited a continued confusion in the realm
20
of foreign policy...”
Niebuhr anedyzes the dominant characteristic of American conservatism in
foreign policy as a peculiar ambivalence between Isolatlonallsm and Imperia-
^*^Reinhold Niebuhr, "American Conservatism and the World Crisis; A Study
in Vacillation," The Yale Review. XL (March, 1951)* 385.
^^Ibid.. p. 387.
^^ibid.. p. 389.
2%iebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, pp. 63-4.
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lism, in short, "between a disavowal of the responsibilities of o\xr power
21
and cm exercise of that power without a sense of its limits." His censure
of conservatism in Merica is not without reservation for he recognizes the
accomplishments of men such as the late Senator Vandenberg and Henry L. Stimson.
22
They represented the "intelligent wing of conservatism" and their contribu¬
tions cure importcmt.
Why has American conservatism deviated from that of its Europecm coun¬
terpart? Niebuhr insists that "American conservatism is not conservative at
23
all in the traditional sense;" rather, it is "a decayed form of nineteenth-
2k
centxiry 'libercQ.ism.'" In other words, conservatism in America is the ethos
of the business community, seeking to preserve economic freedom from govern¬
mental regulations; it is the laissez-faire philosophy of the Physiocrats and
of Adam Smith. And Niebuhr forsees no hopes of establishing a true brand of
conservatism in America.
There is, linfortunateiy, no social locus in America for a valid
'^conservative* philosophy. The more parochial part of the business
community is bound to develop a conservatism in which a decadent
laissez-fcdre libercdism in domestic politics is compounded with na¬
tionalism.2?
We may conclude by pointing out that Niebuhr's concern with the absence
of what he considers to be a genuine conservative philosophy in America is not
^%iebuhr, "American Conservatism and the World Crisis: A Study in Vacil¬
lation," p. 388.
^^Ibid.. p. 397.
^%iebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 55.
^^Niebuhr, "American Conservatism and the World Crisis: A Study in Vacil¬
lation," p. 390.
^%iebuhr, "Liberalism: Illusions and Realities," p. 13.
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"based upon the moral superiority of traditional conservatism. Historically,
he informs us, conservatism served the interests of the aristocratic class
in domestic affairs and was imperialistic in international affairs. Why,
then, one may ask, does Niebuhr extol traditional conservatism when he him¬
self is committed to norms in political behavior?
Its virtue consisted chiefly in its ability to gauge factors of
power in social and International relations which liberals tended
to obscure; cmd to trust the organic processes of social cohesion
rather than the abstract schemes which the liberals were inclined
to advance.26
C. Evaluation
In his analysis of the historical background of American foreign poli¬
cy Niebuhr's central thesis is that the modern world is divided into two op¬
posing alliances (East and West), each of which is under the hegemony of a
nation (Russia and America), sufficiently strong enough to determine inde¬
pendent policy. The United States does not exercise its responsibilities,
partly because of its relative,inexperience as an imperial power, and partly
because the basis of its foreign policy is the liberal-democratic tradition
which assumes the nation-state to be the ultimate form of community except
for its espousal of a vague unlversalism.
This analysis reveals a deep and perplexing problem which we may state
in the following manner. The actual pattern of international community (from
Niebuhr's analysis) unveils a fixed pattern of dminlon and community above
the level of the nation, yet below the level of the "xmiversal community of
mankind." Liberal democracy, assuming the nation-state to be the ultimate
2%iebuhr, (Hiristlan Realism and Political Problems, p. 66.
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form of community, has devised a system of checks and balances which is ca¬
pable of coping with the power dilemma on that level, but which is inadequate
on the level above that of the nation state. The paramount question is how
are the various centers of independent national powers to be made subordi¬
nate to the hegemonic power? Niebuhr says: "There is...no way of applying
the liberal democratic standards to the expression of our power in world af-
27
fairs." In practical terms, how does the United States check, let us say,
the independent power of France, which insists on developing its own nuclear
striking force, thereby adding to the hazards of an atcmilc conflict? It may
well bel ts Nlebtihr states ^that the llberal.-democratic tradition does not pro¬
vide the solution. Yet Niebuhr fails to propose any alternative. The United
States cannot exert its military power to accomplish the cohesiveness neces¬
sary for achieving \mity without offense to other nations. Her moral pres¬
tige is not sufficiently great for the independent centers of power to trust
their destiny in her hands; so, short of an all-out war, there seems to be no
practical solution to the problem.
Niebtihr's analysis of the traditional meanings of conservatism and lib¬
eralism is enlightening. Yet when he applies these terms within the context
of American foreign affairs, he becomes inconsistent. For example, when
speaking of liberalism in foreign affairs, he employs the term to convey the
illusions which liberals share concerning the creation of community, or as he
terms it, their "vague universallsm," and of their inability to grapple with
the realities of power. In this sense liberalism is tantamount to idealism,
which we have examined previously. We are confronted, then, with the para-
27
'Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, p, 29.
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dox of Wilson, one of the great idealists in American history, being lauded
by Niebuhr as the architect of a responsible American foreign policy.
His assertion that there is no true conservative (the ability to recog¬
nize and cope vith the realities of power, in short, realism) tradition in
America leads to further difficulties. For if American foreign policy is
informed by merely two versions of liberalism, what accounts for the superi¬
ority of that version which Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman were heirs to? On
this point Niebuhr writes:
Roosevelt's 'liberalism* was the inheritor of those portions of
the liberal tradition which emphasized not so much the freedom of
economic forces from control as the development of political in¬
stitutions to accomplish the liberal objectives of universal suf¬
frage, equal rights under the law, minimal standards of welfare
and international comity.28
It would seem that the accomplishment of these objectives on the domes¬
tic scene would entice the initiators to attempt similar objectives on the
international scene. However,Niebuhr assures us that hopes for such accom¬
plishments on the international scene are the results of the Illusions of
liberalism.
Niebuhr's conflicting use of the two terms emphasizes the connotative
difficulties which are inherent in these terms. Inasmuch as his definitions
or descriptions of the terms seem to be synonymous vith "realism" and "ideal¬
ism" perhaps he ought to use those terms when dealing with international is¬
sues, and confine his use of conservatism and liberalism to domestic Issues.
^®Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p, 59.
CHAPTER VII::
WORLD LEADERSHIP AND U. S. FOREIGN POLICY
A. The Qoimnuniet Threat
The specter of communism has been transmuted by Soviet Russia into a
grim reality which no longer haunts Europe but menaces the entire world.
The bid by Russia for world leadership presents a serious challenge to Amer¬
ican foreign policy. It is Niebuhr's opinion that communism is a great evil
that wo are fated to live with in our generatiom It is necessary^ therefore,
that we become aware not merely of the evil itself, but of its sources so
that we will entertain no illusions as to the nature of the threat which the
evil poses for us. 'The evil of comuunism, ” Niebuhr informs us,
...flows from a combination of political and 'spiritual' factors,
which prove that the combination of power and pride is responsi¬
ble for tur^ng the illusory dreams of yesterday into the present
nightmare, which disturbs the ease of millions of men In our gen^*
oration.^
What are the inherent factors in the communist dogma that make communism
evil? Niebuhr isolates four such factors and analyzes each of thou. The
first factor is the monopoly of power which communism establishes. Injus-
#
ties is the fruit of disproportions of power in ai^y community, Niebuhr as¬
serts, 'but a system which gives some men absolute power over other men re-
2
suits in evils which are worse than injustice.' Communism places the locus
of power in the hands of the partyj a small oligarchy within the party grad¬
ually assumes power a33d rules with a despotic grip. There axe no constitu¬
tional means by which the powers of the oligarchy'can be checked. The monop-




oly of power represents to Niebuhr the basic source of the evils of commu¬
nism.
The second factor which contributes to the inherent evilness of com¬
munism, in Niebuhr's analysis, is the moral pretensions derived from the
utopian illusions of communism, "According to these illusions every policy
of Marxist propaganda and class conflict has the object of hastening the
3
day...when an ideal classless society will emerge," Niebuhr attributes the
loyalties of certain groups of intellectuals to these illusions, and points
out that they enable the communists to masq.uerade as liberators while en¬
slaving their victims.
The third factor, distinguished by Niebuhr, is the commxuxist's claim
that the proletarian class can, by a "revolutionary" act, change both histo¬
ry and the human situation. Man ceases to be creature and creator and be¬
comes simply creator. "This tendency of playing God to human history is the
cause for a great deal of commxinist malignancy." Whenever events in history
do not conform to the logic of the communist's creed, the oligarchy is prone
to become furious and in their frustrations tend to choose unwise courses of
action which precipitate crises.
The fourth factor making for the evil of communism is the coupling of
Marxist dogmatism with scientific rationality, "The comm\inist irrationality
and dogmatism consist of a rigorous adhesion to dogma in defiance of the
5
facts," Furthermore, the rigor of the dogma m^es for ideological inflexi-




bility. The western traditions of Czechoslovakia and the Confuclan tradi¬
tions of China failed to modify the dogma.
B, Collective Security
Collective security, as a method of establishing peace, has h€^ a strong
appeal both in the United States and in Great Britain, Niebuhr avers. It
was expressed in the League of Nations and more recently in the United Na¬
tions. Yet, "Despite the superior realism which informs the constitution of
the United Nations its policy of collective security has proved almost as
6
ephemeral as that of the League of Nations."
What is the nature of collective security and why does Niebuhr denounce
the concept as illusory? A prominent political realist describes collective
security in the following manner:
In a working system of collective secxxrity, the problem of securi¬
ty is no longer the concern of the individual nation,-to be taken
care of by armaments and other elements of national power. Securi¬
ty becomes the concern of all nations, which will take care col¬
lectively of the security of each of them as though their own se¬
curity were at stake.7
The provision for the establishing of collective sec\irity under the
Cheirter of the United Nations is to be found in Article 1*3, paragraph 1. It
states:
All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance
with a special agreement or agreeaents, armed forces, assistance,
and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and secxirity.
^Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, p. 263.
"^Hans J. Morgenthau, Polities Among Nations (New York, I960), pp. 412-3.
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The Russians have refused to make proportionate contributions to a
joint force, thereby rendering the provision ineffective. It must be noted
that Niebuhr's objection to collective security/is not based primarily^oi^
the refusal of the Soviet Union to contribute itsiproportionate share of
troops and other items imder Article 4^ of the Charter of the United Nations,
but on more fundamental grouiids. He conceives of collective security as just
another endeavor by those who seek to solve the complex problem of community
by constitutional means.
...liberal democracy^ is particularly/mistaken in assuming that it
can easily come to terms with the global dimension of the problem
of community by appeal to the principle of 'collective securityi*
Reliance on this principle is the consistent climax of the volun!c>
tarism which has informed so much of modern political thought.^
Niebuhr never ceases to remind us that community cannot be created by'
fiat. We neglect the organic factors of community at our own risks, he
warns us.
0; Coexistenee
The current contest for leadership in the international arena presents
the world with two altematives—total war or coexistence. But, "...an
atomic war of global proportions is so unthinkable as a conscious choice
that we must adjust ourselves to the prospect of making coexistence with sl
9
worldwide tyranny as sufferable as possible." Niebuhr does not rule out
the possibility of total war through accident or miscalculation, but he in¬
sists that the possibility of a nuclear war is so frightful that we must come
®Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, p. 260.
%einhold Niebuhr, "Coexistence or Total War?" The Christian Century-,
August 18, 195^, p. 971*
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to terms with the other alternative—coexistence. In his estimate^ the
first precondition of competitive coexistence "...is that both sides come
10
to a full recognition of their involvement in a common fate."
In the event that a nuclear holocaust is avoided, Niebuhr views the ix&-
pending contest as a fateful one in which the political and economic re¬
sources of the two competing ^sterns will vie with each other in efforts to
attract the uncommitted nations.
"We must think particularly of comparative political and economic re¬
sources in the struggle, for these will undoubtedly dominate our history/^
.11and that of the world for decades to come."
Concerning the political aspect of competitive coexistence, Niebuhr
says, "the struggle is not simply a contest betweeni despotism and freedom
12
as maiy/complacently assume." To view the struggle merely-in terms of
freedom and despotism is to obscure the reality/of the situation. It is too
neat a cleavage for it assumes that freedom abounds in the West and that the
Soviets are ruled with a despotic grip. Freedom in the "free world" is not
as ubiquitous as we would like to a8s\u:e ourselves. "Ihe record of the *free
world* proves that the compatibility between freedom, justice and stability/
is a rare achievement."'
On- the other hand, the present Russian society is an emerging and dy^
namic one, which according to Niebuhr, cannot be understood, politically^
^^Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, p. 281.
^^Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Long Ordeal of Coexistence," Ihe New Republic,




either in terms of analogy with Hitler’s despotism or in comparison with
Stalin’s reign of terror. "That society is dominated by a Communist creed,
but it is also the prey of contests of interest between competing oligarch-
lU
ies—economic, military and political."
To be sure, the Russian system is still totalitarian, but its charac¬
ter is changed somewhat by the presence of the different oligarchies com¬
peting for power. lii Niebuhr’s analysis. Premier Khrushchev haa restored
the political oligarchy by subordinating the economic and military oligarchs
which will probably prevent the rise of an independent source of power to
check the monopoly of power he currently wields. The possibility of his¬
torical development within the Russian system which would lead to an open
society, is not wholly discounted, but he tells us that "It would be foolish
to expect an inflexible system either quickly or even gradually to develop
into an open society."
Niebuhr avers that the newly emerging nations are none too eager to
adopt our political system. Communism holds out promises of almost "instant"
industrialization and the abundance associated with a technical society.
These promises are attractive not merely to the oppressed but to the leaders
who wish to make the '^great leap" forward from an agricultural to a technical
society overnight.
The economic phase of competitive coexistence is viewed by Niebuhr with
concern for in this realm our present position is rather disturbing. In com¬
paratively short time the Russians have achieved technical efficiency. Here-
l^Ibid., p. 11.
^5Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations euid Empires, p. 282.
tofore, the West was noted not only for political freedom hut also techno¬
logical supremacy. All technical backward nations previously looked to the
West for guidance.
If Communism now steals the 'emperor's clothes' of this prestige
and sets itself up as the necessary prereq.ulsite of industriali¬
zation, one must recognize...that the claim will seem plausible
to some of the budding nations of the awakened nations.
The Russians further enjoy the advantage of dispensing with foreign aid
at their discretion. The productive capacity of the nation can be bairtered
away with but small consideration for the standard of living at home.
Niebuhr does not believe that the present character of the Soviet sys¬
tem will last forever. Along with certain historical developments which we
have already mentioned, the educational system which has produced a technical
and dynamic society, will cause changes in the political situation. must
realize that we are not fated to share the world with the present despotism
forever. It is xmder the ferment of a culture which is bound to produce po¬
ll
litical effects in the long run," In the interim, the "long ordeal of co¬
existence" is before us. Furthermore, the impending
...contest can be successful only if we are armed not with a sense
of virtue of our cause, but with a fvill realization of the hazards
we face in the military, economic and political realms in this
struggle; and only if we are fully conscious of the political and
moral ambiguities in which we are involved.
D, Evaluation
Niebuhr correctly diagnoses the chief evil of communism as the monopoly
of power which it places in the hands of an oligarchy (the Politburo) with-
l^Hiebuhr, "The Long Ordeal of Coexistence," p. 12
^"^Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, p. 28U,
iSniebuhr, "The Long Ordeal of Coexistence," p. 12.
75
in the Pscrty. This is true because whenever power is not made responsible,
whenever it becomes absolute, it tends to corrupt the wielder. This is what
Lord Acton meant in famous dictum: Power tends to corrupt, and absolute pow¬
er corrupts absolutely. However, we must question Kiebxdir*s assertion that
the monopoly of power which the leaders of the Soviet Union currently exer¬
cise is inherent in Marxism as a political idea, Niebuhr admits that "Marx¬
ism did not indeed plan the highly centralized power structure of commu-
19
nism," At the same time he says, "Marx did plan for a 'dictatorship of
20
the proletariat,'" which according to his analysis would have, in time,
degenerated into the highly centralized power structure which is evident to¬
day. But is this necessarily the case?
In the first place, according to Professor Sidney Hook, the concept of
the "dictatorship of the proleteuriat" was not a well developed idea in Marx's
political philosophy.
The phrase 'dictatorship of the proletariat* which was later to
prove such a fateful bone of contention among those who called
themselves Marxists was not used in any major published work of
Marx and only twice in his correspondence,21
He further notes the democratic aspect of the concept as conceived by Marx.
As Marx conceived it, the political expression of the social'dic¬
tatorship of the proletariat' takes the form of a workers* democ¬
racy. Engels and Marx both regarded the Paris Commune, in which
many parties peurticipated and in which the followers of Marx were
a tiny minority, as a 'dictatorship of the proletariat.* The po¬
litical processes of democracy as they exist under capitalism are
broadened so that the people by referendum and recall have a
greater direct influence upon the agencies of the state. As
^^Nlebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems. p« 35.
gPlbid.
21sidney Hook. Marx and the Marxists (Princeton. 1955)* P. 33.
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Marxism as a movement developed, the phrase...fell into almost
total disuse in every politically democratic country until it
was revived hy the followers of Lenin and Trotsky.^2
Under Leninism the "dictatorship of the proletariat" gradually evolved
into the dictatorship of the Peirty, and finally within the Party, power was
consolidated by a small oligeurchy—members of the Politburo.
The conception of the dictatorship of the Party over the prole¬
tariat, confirmed by the whole history of the Soviet Union,
marks an absolute break with all the democratic traditions of
Marxism. From it there follows, together with Lenin’s views
about the internal nature of the Party, the outlawry of all
other political parties of the working class, all dissident fac¬
tions within the Party, the dictatorship of the Party leadership
over the Party, and the grim outlines of a totalitarian control
over the whole of society.23
Niebuhr’s analysis of collective security is concerned mainly with the
larger question of creating community. His treatment of the problem cen¬
ters, therefore, upon only one weakness of the doctrine and is not exhaus¬
tive. Even if the issue of community were not at stake, the belief that
peace can be secured through an arrangement in which 6J.1 nations agree to
collective action against a state transgressing international law or com¬
mitting aggression, would be open to serious debate. This is so because the
major premises of collective security are false. There are three premises
upon which the doctrine is built: (l) States are persons; (2) States are
equal; (3) and States act in accordance with principles. But the facts of
the matter, as noted by Professor Frederick L, Schuman, are that "States
are persons in law, but not persons in fact. States are equal in law, but





their interests In fact....*
Walter Llpinaanni has made a revealing case against collective security
which we feel necessary to quote in its entirety:for it demonstrates the
central difficulty of the principle which is lacking in Niebuhr's analysis.
The trouble with collective security is...that 'when the issue is
less than the survival of the great nations, the method of col¬
lective security will not be used because it is just as terrify**
ing to the policeman as it is to the lawbreakers. Itpunishes
the law-enforcing states, at least until they have paid the aw-
fVil price of victory, as much as the law-breaking states. There¬
fore it cannot be used as a method of ordinary' and continuing'Sift*
foreement....There would bo little surgeiy if the surgeon had to
amputate his own arm when he was called upon to amputate the pa¬
tient's leg. There would be little enforcement of law in over
cities if, in order to arrest burglars, murders and violators
of the traffic ordinances, the police had to start a fight in
which the courthouse,, the jail, and their own homes were likely
to be demolished. Men will not burn down the barn in order to
roast a pig; the method of collective security is, I repeat, too
crude, too expensive, and too unreliable for general and regular
use. It proposes to achieve peaice through law ly calling upon
great masses of innocent people to stand ready to exterminate
great masses of innocent people. No world order can be founded
upon such a principle; it cannot commai^ the support of civilized
men, least of all of democratic men who respect the individual
and consider it the very essence of justice to distinguish be¬
tween the guilty and the innocent, the responsible and the irre¬
sponsible. '2^
24prederick L. Schuman, International Politics (New York, IS^) P» 260. '
25Quoted by Schuman, op. cit., p. 261
CHAPTER VIII
THE WORLD OOIWNITr
Recent world events^ tend to confirm Niebuhr's judgment that b^ond the
national conmunltj lies International chaos. "The problem of overcoming
this chaost and of extending the principle of community to world-wide terma
2
has become the most urgent of ell the Issues which face our epoch. * The
mere necessity for a thing Is no guarantee that It will or can come Into
existence; yet the urgency/ and the necessltjr of restoring order on a world¬
wide basis have led many to believe that such an end can bd accomplished byr
constitutional means. Peirtlcularly Is this the case In America. "The ex¬
cessive devotlonito constitutional answers for world problems In America
seeios to be a dubious Inheritance from the whole 'social-contract* theory of
government with which the liberal democratic movement began."
Niebuhr recognizes the need for stability/ In.the International arenas
but he adamantly Inveighs against proposals to create world government
flat. Nor Is It possible^ he maintains, for governments to create community.
We shall fully explore these twin problezas, in this, the concluding chapter
of our study. The problems of world government and of community are inex¬
tricably/interwoven and though we have separated them for purposes of analy¬
sis, we must not lose sight of the fact that to Niebuhri the creatloni of
community Is prior to, and necessary- for,: any scheme of world government.
^The Cuban.crisis and related events.
p
Niebuhr, The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness, p. 155.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, "The l^yth of World Government," The Nation^, March-16.
19^, P. 515.
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A, The Illusion of World Government
Niebuhr writes:
The fallacy of world government can be stated in two simple pro¬
positions. The first is that governments are not created by fi¬
at... The second is that governments have only limited effica¬
cy in integrating a community.^
He argues that those who believe that the United States was created by
fiat overlook the obvious fact that the purpose of the constitutions was to
"establish a more perfect union;" this presupposes the existence of a gov¬
ernment prior to the constitution. "No groups of individuals have ever
5
created either government or community out of whole cloth."
Those who advocate world government by fiat ignore the problem of sov¬
ereignty. They propose the calling of a world constitutional convention
which would draw up the necessary world constitution; this document would then
be submitted to the nation states for ratification. The nations, of course,
would have to abrogate or abridge their sovereignty so that the new world
state could be invested with supreme power. But, "No such explicit abnega-
6
tion has ever taken place in the history of the world," says Niebuhr. It is
preposterous to believe that an Intransigent nation, e.g., Russia, would
agree to surrender its sovereignty to a highly integrated world government
when in a loosely organized interaational body such as the United Nations,
it hsis refused to relinquish its veto power.
li




The creation of government by fiat is but one of the fallacious propo¬
sitions. The other, as we have noted, is the relationship between govern¬
ment and community. In Niebuhr's view, governments cannot create communi¬
ty—and community is necessary for the creation of world government. He
avers that any attempt to create community by constitutional, legal, or gov-
ernmentEd means will be unsuccessful because such schemes are in complete
disregard of the fact
...which history attests on every page, that governments may per¬
fect the order and Jvistice of a community but cannot create a
community—for the simple reason that the authority of government
if primarily the authority of the community itself.7
In other words, the community cannot be coerced into basic order; the
order must come from its innate cohesion. The community has a conception of
Justice; laws are obeyed in direct proportion as they correspond to the com-
mxmlty's sense of Justice. The creation of commxmity on the international
level is vastly different from the national level. The difference is so vast
that no constitutional magic can span the chasm.
National and imperial conummities all have ethnic, linguistic, ge¬
ographical, historical, and other forces of social unity. The \ini-
versal community, however, has no common language or common cul¬
ture-nothing to create the conscioxxsness of ”we.”8
This brings us to the role which the United Nations fulfills in the ab¬
sence of a genuine world government and community.
B, The Role of the United Nations
A great deal of Niebuhr's writings has been directed against the preva¬
lent notion that the Uhited Nations is, or can become, a world government.
TNiebuhr, "The Jtyth of World Government," p. 312
Qlbid.. p. 313.
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With tongue^in-cheek, he writes: "The United Nations is not exactly the
'Parliament of Mankind and Federation of the World' which the nineteenth cen¬
tury fondly believed to be the ^*one far-off divine event, to which the whole
9
creation moves."
The United Nations was organized on the fundamental principle of unanim¬
ity among the great powers; this principle expressed itself in the right of
the veto, which was given to each of them. The abuses of the right to veto
by the Soviet government have led many to venture the opinion that were this
right abolished, the United Nations could be transformed into a genuine world
government, Niebuhr, however, interprets the right of veto differently. It
represents, to him, the shrewd political Insight that Insufficient community
has been created for the conception of world government. "This insight is
that the world community is not sufficiently Integrated to permit a majority
10
to be victorious over a minority in the councils of nations,"
The United Nations hw not been assigned into political oblivion by Nie¬
buhr, On the contrary, he believes that it can play a very vital and in^or-
tant role in international affairs,
...the United Nations is a necessary and useful instrument of for¬
eign diplomacy in a global situation. It is a forum in which the
policies of nations can contend with each other and gain the re¬
spect and adhesion of various nations according to the merit of
these policies.il
Niebuhr envisages the possibility that in time the United Nations may
12
create "centers of real authority" within itself which would tend to mlti-
9Niebuhr, The Self and Dramas of History, p. 202.
lOlbid.. p, 206.
llNiebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, p, 266,
12lbid.
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gate the power struggle among nations. However, he Insists that mere changes
in its constitutional make-up will not cause it to evolve into a world gov¬
ernment. "Perhaps," he writes, "no constitutional contrivance is or will be
13
capable of this task."
Toward the Creation of a World Community
Our discussion to this point may well have instilled in the reader’s
mind the erroneous assumption that Niebuhr believes there are no organic
forces operating to produce the requisite social tissue for the creation of
community and government on the international level. This is not the case
lU
for he recognizes and delineates three forces which, in his analysis, help
to create community.
The first of these forces is the economic interdependence of the peoples
of the world made necessary by the technical achievements of our civiliza¬
tions "Our problem," we are Infotmed, "is that technics have established a
rudimenteury world community but have not integrated it organically, morally
15
or politically."
The second force in the social tissue of the world community is the fear
of mutual destruction. The atomic stockpiles of the two major powers have in
recent years heightened this factor. In the past, according to Niebuhr, co¬
hesion has resulted from the belief that order is preferable to anarchy.
However, "There is no record in history of peoples establishing a common com-
^3ibid.
^^Niebuhr, "The Hybh of World Government," p. 313.
15Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p, 15,
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mimlty because they feared each other, though there are many instances when
16
the fear of a common foe acted as the cement of cohesion."
The final force, which Niebuhr perceives to be the most important of
the three, is a moral one. There is a religious and philosophical sense of
world community waiting to be actualized in the culture of all nations.
"Enlightened men in all nations have some sense of obligation to their fel-
17
low-men, beyond the limits of their nation-state." Despite the importance
which he attaches to this force, Niebuhr is aware of its political limita¬
tion. This is so because "Political cohesion requires common convictions on
18
particular issues of Justice; and these are lacking."
The forces which tend to make for the integration of the world communi¬
ty are limited and their effects are minimal. But the task is not tinimpor-
tsnt and no strivings toward this elusive goal are in vain.
The task of building a world community is man's final necessity
and possibility,' but also his final impossibility. It is a neces¬
sity and possibility because history is a process which extends
the freedom of meua over natural process to the point where uni¬
versality is reached. It is an impossibility because man is, de¬
spite his increasing freedom, a finite creature, wedded to time
and place and Incapable of building arjy structure of culture or
civilization which does not have its foundations in a particular
and dated locus.
The world community, standing thus as the final possibility and
impossibility of human life, will be in actuality the perpetual
problem as well as the constant fulfillment of human hopes.
^%iebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 28.
^*^Ibid.
^Qlbid.
^%iebuhr. The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness, pp. I87-8.
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Stripped of its dlaleetieall complexity^, this Ik Niebuhr'ii manner of
Baying*;
Perhaps we are fated, for some centuries at least,, to lire In a
situation In which the global community' appears to be a necesslr^
ty because of the Interdependence of nations,, but an impossibili¬




There are almost as many proposals for the establishment of a world
government as there are books and pamphlets on the subject. Some are so ut-
22
terly devoid of political Insight that one feels they are deserving of the
polemics which Niebuhr has hurled against them. Others are so complicated
In their attempt to provide the machinery^ needed to put their cumbersome
plans in operation that they are almost certain to fail from sheer admlnistra-
■■23 ’ 'tlve complications. ^ In general^, those who advocate world government sug¬
gest two means by which they'propose to implement their plans* (1) through a
revision of the Charter of the United Nations, and (2) ty a method Indepen¬
dent of the United Nations.
Both of these suggested means call for the abridgement or abrogation of
sovereignty by'the nation-state. As Niebuhr has pointed put this would be a
2®Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, p. 26^
^^For a erosB-sectlon of representative proposals, see JT. E. Johnson,
ed.. Federal World Government, (New TPrk, 1948)'.
22gee the discussion of Dr. Einstein’s proposal by E. Muller et. al..
Chapter 14, Harry'H. Moore, ed.. Survival . or Suicide (New lB>rk, 1948)'.
^^See Stuart Chevalier’s analysis of Fremond Rider'!b plan for a world
parliament based upon the educational qualification of the region or country-
represented, J. E. Johnson, op. elt., pp. I67-88.
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most difflcvilt task for no nation in history has voluntarily abnegated its
sovereignty. The Connally amendment is sufficient evidence that even in the
United States where sentiments for the establishment of a world government
are high, a nation is most reluctant to divest Itself of sovereignty. And
Professor Herbert W. Briggs points out a most disturbing truth;
...sovereignty is not a fact; nor is it actual power; it is a log¬
ical theory, concerning the authority of the state in the field of
law. If you abolish the concept, power would remain.24
For those who insist that Riissia is the only barrier to the creation of
world government and that steps for its establishment ought to proceed with¬
out the participation of the Soviets, Niebuhr rightly avers that such a
scheme in the name of one world, would in fact create two.
Niebuhr's case against the creation of a world government, as we have
stated, ultimately rests upon his assumption that government cannot create
community-—that world conmunity is prior to, and necessary for, the creation
of world government. It is generally agreed that any world government must
be based upon common principles- and common:Ideals. .The question is how co¬
hesive must the community be before it is possible for such principles and
ideals to become actualized in a world government. Robert M. Hutchins takes
the position that Niebuhr desires "too much" community for the establishment
of a world government.
...I am afraid that Mr. Niebuhr exaggerates the state of perfec¬
tion which world community must achieve before world government
can be considered. Before the atomic bomb we could take world
government or leave it. We could rely on the long process of
evolution to bring world community and world government hand in
hand. Any such program today means another war, and another war
^^erbert W. Briggs, "The Problem of World .Government," Federal World
Government. p. 210.
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means the end of civilization. The slogan of our faith must be,
world government is necessary, and therefore possible,25
Obviously, it is not true that the desire for world government is in it¬
self sufficient for its attainment, but Mr. Hutchins does raise an important
point. The sheer necessity for world order may help to produce the conscious¬
ness needed for community. It may help to broaden the "sense of obligation"
of men to their fellowmen which Niebuhr attributes to enlightened men in all
nations.
There is a process of interaction between government and community which
is obscured by Niebuhr when he insists that community must precede government.
"The Constitution of the United States," Hutchins says, "has educated the peo¬
ple of this cotmtry to believe in and support the Constitution of the United
26
States."
Of the three embryonic forces which he analyzes as contributing toward
the growth of world community, the economic interdependence of the world msyr
yet prove to be a greater force than the moral one. The economic success of
the European Common Market has produced a consciousness of community among
its members which was previously thou^t impossible. If the political inte¬
gration of the member states becomes a reality, a United Europe will emerge.
This economic and political giant may well provide the Impetus for further
cooperation of nations which would lead to more consciousness of community
and of the common destiny of all men. It is quite possible that regional in¬
tegration must precede any eventual world commvinity. The step from a region-
^^Robert M, Hutchins, "The Constitutional Foundations for World Order,"
Federal World Government, p. 111.
^^Ibid., p. 112.
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al community to a world community may prove less hazardous than the Jump
from the national to the world community. In the meantime, most nations
will continue to go their separate ways; hut the world community remains
"the perpetual problem as well as the constant fulfillment of human hopes."
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